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Abstract
This study was focused particularly on assessing the effectiveness of group lending and its
impact on profitability at Oromiya Credit and Saving Share Company of Jimma Zone. To
achieve this objective, the researcher used primary and secondary data. The researcher used
questionnaires, interviews and relevant documents to gather primary and secondary data from
the data sources and collects the questionnaires from 252 borrowers and interviewed 4 branch
manager of OCSSCO from the population.
Descriptive statistics with the help of Pie charts, graphs, table, Percentages were used in
analyzing the collected data. In addition to this econometric model by employing SPSS
(Statistical Package for Social Scientists) version -J 6 windows software were used to analysis.
With the help of logit model the researcher found that educational level, business type, land size,
other source of credit social ties, number of the group, screening the group before the formation,
internal rule and conduct, credit officer visit the group, distance and family size were positive
and statistically significant at J%, 5% and J0% significance level. While the age of the group
member, gender of the group member, visiting each other and training are positive and
insignificant.
The study recommended that the OCSSCO of Jimma zone should give attention on distance
between the group members, the period of training, educational level of the borrower,
experience and credit officer visit/pressure to make the group lending effective and to have
impacts on profitability.
Keywords: Group, Group lending, OCSSCO of Jimma zone, Logit model
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Microfinance is the supply of loans, savings, money transfers, insurance, and other financial
services to low-income people. Microfinance institutions (MFls) encompass a wide range of
providers that vary in legal structure, mission, and methodology offer these financial services to
clients who do not have access to mainstream banks or other formal financial service providers
( Lafourcade et.al200S ).
Microfinance institutions (MFls) grant collateral-free loans (group lending) to poor
entrepreneurs whose income originates mostly from informal economic activities. As a
consequence, MFls are often committed to rely on soft information to assess their
borrowers' creditworthiness (Bernheim et.al2012).
Beginning in the mid-seventies, savings and credit institutions started extending small loans to
groups of poor women in the villages in order to empower them to invest in micro level
businesses. This form of micro-enterprise credit is based on solidarity based group lending where
every group member is tasked to ensure the repayment of all members (Chakravarty et.al20 10).
Microcredit (loan) is one of the financial services which include the act of providing loans of
small amounts to the poor and other borrowers that have been ignored by commercial banks.
Micro-loan is, therefore, a synonym for microcredit, and this financial service is in focus
since it is the main service of the MFI"s. Under this definition, microcredit encompasses all
lenders, including the formal participants such as specialized credit cooperatives set u~ by
governments to encourage economic development and those of a more informal variety like the
village moneylenders or even loan sharks. The average loan size of an MFI is an interesting
factor since that the smaller the loans are the more expensive to disburse than larger loans
(Jorgensen, 2011).
1
The terms microcredit and microfinance are often used interchangeably, it is important to
recognize the distinction between the two. Microcredit refers to the act of providing the loan.
Microfinance, on the other hand, is the act of providing these same borrowers with financial
services, such as savings institutions and insurance policies. In short, microfinance encompasses
the field of microcredit (Sengupta et.aI2008).
Micro-finance is one of the ways of building the capacities of the poor who are largely ignored
by commercial banks and other lending institution and graduating them to sustainable self-
employment activities by providing them financial services like credit, savings and insurance. By
focusing on small amounts, and easing collateral requirements, micro finance institution are
better equipped to target poor individuals or groups who need resources to finance small scale
investments. These Loans can be sufficient to promote independent and profitable economic
projects, expand the opportunity set faced by poor group's member and thereby alleviate poverty
(Rai et.aI2011).
In countries where poverty levels are high and financial services do not reach the vast
majority, microcredit is important in encouraging entrepreneurial activity and alleviating
poverty. However, microcredit can only be effective if it is carefully used to ensure that both
the lender and the borrower acquire the maximum possible gain. Group lending has been
used successfully in some parts of the world to expand the reach of microcredit programs
that is notably by the Grameen Bank (Kodongo et.aI2013).
Group lending provides a loan to an individual borrower, who is a member of a borrowing group.
The group of borrowers is made responsible for the repayment of the loan of the individual group
member. Non-repayment by the group means that all borrowers in the group will be
without future access to loans from the program. In this way, group lending creates
incentives for individual group members to select the other members of the group to enforce
repayment, because each individual wants to reduce the risk to ensure the access to future loans.
Group lending structure motivates screening, monitoring and enforcement within the group,
to improves the effectiveness of group lending due to the fact that the group members live in
the same area and socially tied, repayment of group loans will be higher(Lehener, 2009).
Since the establishment of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in 1976, the practice of group
lending has been widely adopted in micro finance programs in developing countries as an
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important tool to provide credit to the poor. In group lending (or joint liability) a loan is granted
to a group of borrowers and the whole group is liable for the debt of any individual member in
the group. This practice allows microfinance programs to mainly rely on accountability and
mutual trust among group members rather than financial collateral to insure against default.
Given that the poor often do not have appropriate financial collateral to offer, group lending
programs offer a feasible and even profitable channel to extend credit to the poor, who are
usually kept out of traditional banking systems (Li et.al2009).
Dellien et.al (2005) discusses two key points about group lending programs. First, time and
effort is invested in building social networks that enable groups to select members who
are creditworthy under group lending, the role of loan officers is to provide structure,
training on loan processes and administrative support. Second, the principle incentives for
repayment of group loans is joint liability, group reputation, credit rating and future
access to credit for each member, all of which are directly reliant on each member up
holding their obligations.
Like in other areas of the world, peoples in Ethiopia are living under poverty. Finance institution
in general and microfinance institution in particular plays crucial role in the development of
Ethiopia in general and Jimma zone of oromia in particular. However, no study has been under
taken in Jimma zone regarding any group lending in general and effectiveness of group lending
and its impact on profitability in particular.
1.2 Statement of the problem
Lending is a risky enterprise because repayment of loans can seldom be fully guaranteed .For
this reason, lenders devise varies institutional mechanisms aimed at reducing the risk of loan
default like pledging of collateral, third party credit guarantee, use of credit rating and collection
agencies, group lending and etc.(Sharma and Zeller, 1996).
The effectiveness of micro credit as a tool to combat poverty is much debated now that after years
of rapid growth microfinance institutions (MFIs) in various countries - including India, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and Nicaragua - are struggling with client over indebtedness, repayment
problems, and in some cases a political backlash against the microfinance sector as a whole
(Attanasio et. al20 11).
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Lack of access to external finance is generally seen as one of the main reasons why many people
in developing economies remain poor. Usually, the poor have no access to loans from the formal
banking system, because they cannot put up acceptable collateral and because the costs for banks
of screening and monitoring the activities of the poor, and of enforcing their contracts, are too
high to make lending to this group profitable. The poor in developing economies have
increasingly gained access to small loans with the help of so-called micro finance programs
(Heremes et.a/2003).
Repayment of loans is an important measure for the success of group lending programs. In the
long run, programs may only survive if groups repay the loans they receive. When borrowers
form groups and are held liable for each other, lending to the poor can be profitable even if
borrowers do not possess any collateral and lack a credit history (Lehener, 2009).
The difficulty to reach the financial sources is one of the main obstacles to an increased
involvement of the poor borrowers to the economic development. This layer of the population is
ineligible to the classic banking sector because of lack of collateral permitting the covering of the
value of the loan in case of repayment problems. The microfinance emerged as an economic
development approach oriented toward households of weak income. Instead of bestowing some
individual micro credits, MFI in developing countries prefer to lend to groups of people that are
jointly responsible for the repayment of the received loan (Bassem, 2008). One important reason
why the methodology of group lending with joint liability is popular among MFIs is that it forces
group borrowers to use their social ties in order to screen, monitor and enforce loan repayment
on their peers (Postelnicu, 2012).
MFI play an important role in mobilizing financial resources for micro enterprise by extending
credit to various business and individuals (member of group). Lending represents the heart ofthe
MFI and loans are the dominant assets as they generate the largest share of operating income.
However, loan exposes the institution to the risk. In Ethiopia research have been done on
determinants of access to credit and loan amount household-level evidence from urban Ethiopia
but not considering of theoretical part of effectiveness of group lending and its impact on
profitability. Abi (2000) attempted to examine the determinants of access to credit and loan
amount house hold -level evidence from urban Ethiopia using information obtained only from
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urban clients. The Past studies in Ethiopia on microfinance institution focused on determinants of
access to credit and loan amount on house hold level evidence from urban Ethiopia. As well
Guush and Gardebroek (2012) held on the studies on the assessing the long term impact of micro
credit on the rural poverty which is emphasized on the long term impact of in microcredit in
Ethiopia. However, if any development effort is to bring about improvement in the microfinance
institution group lending and its impact on profitability, making the group benefited of an
increased production, consumption, education and health - such as, what are the impacts of
group lending on profitability? -should be answered so that appropriate interventions can be
made. However, this thesis has been examined on different problems associated with that reduce
the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability of microfinance institutions.
1.3 Research Question
Do the internal rule and conduct, have effect on group lending effectiveness and its impact on
profitability?
Does the credit default of the group for the disbursed loan show that the ineffectiveness of the
group lending and its impact on profitability?
1.4 Objectives of the Study
1.4.1 General objective
The main objective of the study is to examine and assess the effectiveness of group lending and
its impact on profitability in OCSSCO of Jimma zone
Especially this study was addressed on the assessment of effectiveness of group lending and its
impact on profitability in OCSSCO Jimma Zone assuming the following Specific objectives.
v" To identify factors that affect the effectiveness of group lending
v" To assess the profitability of group lending on the group member living standard and
v" To provide the mechanisms of improving the effectiveness of group lending.
1.5 Significance of the Study
An effective and efficient loan is important for the economic development of the borrowers.
Because ifthere are effective and efficient loan will be implemented, there may be an increase in
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income, which helps to fulfill the socio-economic needs of the individual or borrowers of the
institution. Accordingly, improvement in the loan of microfinance institution is of great
importance for micro enterprise in which loan serve as assets.
The finding from this thesis, therefore, is expected to benefit various stakeholders in numerous
ways. Some of these are:
~ This study initiates the institution to give closer attention towards the administration and
follow ups as well as conduct awareness creation programs to achieve the desired
objectives.
~ This study contributes towards effectiveness of the loan system by identifying impeding
factors for the borrowers of OCSSCO of Jimma zone of Oromia region.
~ It indicates the ways that the institutions officials will have to do in the future base on the
views of the borrowers towards the loan.
~ The research significantly in providing a reference material for those who are interested
in conducting further research on the area of loan in microfinance institution.
1.6 Scope of the Study
The study purposively focuses on OCSSOCO in Jimma zone of Oromia region. Therefore, the
study had been limited to the Jimma zone. In addition, collection of data on assessing the
effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability is collected using transaction
surveys to capture occasional variations. And the survey has been only for short period of time
and this had obviously limited the temporal dimension of the study.
1.7 Limitations of the Study
It is obvious that adequate and reliable information is important to undertake any kind of survey
precautions. In addition, since lending with microfinance institutions are a current phenomenon,
especially in Jimma zone the absence of enough reference materials regarding the group lending
effectiveness and its impact on profitability and Availability of the respondents due to their busy
schedule was also a challenge cited as one of the limitations of conducting this study.
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1.8 Organization of the thesis
This thesis attempts to assess the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability in
OCSSCO of Jimma Zone. Accordingly, the thesis is organized in a way that chapter one deals
with the introduction of the study, chapter two presents the Review of the Related Literature,
and chapter three brings the Research Methodology part of the study. Chapter four presents the
findings, data presentation and interpretationsas well as the last chapter deals with the
Conclusions and Recommendations parts of the study.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 BASIC CONCEPTS AND EVOLUTION OF GROUP LENDING
Group lending, as the term already indicates, requires individuals to organize themselves into
groups in order to gain access to financial services from a program (Mehrteab, 2005). Aghion
and Morduch (2005) defined Group lending as arrangements of individuals without collateral
who get together and form groups with the aim of obtaining loans from a lender. It involves the
formation of groups of people who have a common wish to access financial services.
Group lending refers to the different methods used for the common goal of lending to low
income households that are different from the standard loan contracts. It is the
establishment of institutes or networks with a system that would utilize the societal assets of the
borrowers in the absence of physical possessions (Khawari, 2004).
Many group based lending programs target the very poor who cannot meet the traditional
collateral requirements of most financial institutions. The special characteristic is that the loans
are made individually to the group members, but all in the group mate the result if any member
going to serious repayment challenges. Since the establishment of the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh in 1976, the exercise of group lending has been widely adopted in microfinance
programs in developing countries as an important tool to give credit to the poor. In group lending
(or joint liability) a loan is granted to a group of borrowers and the whole group is responsible
for the debt of any individual member in the group (Li et.aI2009).
Li et ai, (2009) State that the origin of group lending can be traced back to 1976 when the 2006
Nobel Peace Prize winner, Muhammad Yunus, started the Grameen Bank Project, a lending
project in several villages in Bangladesh. The objective of the project is to examine the
feasibility of a credit delivery system (Grameen Bank) specifically targeted to the rural poor,
who often do not have collateral and cannot obtain credit from predictable banks. In case of
requiring collateral, group lending system employs a group-based loan approach and depends on
peer effects within groups to guarantee repayment. The project has achieved great success in
delivering credit to the poor. The achievement of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has inspired
8
similar endeavors in more than 40 developing countries, including one of Bangladesh's
neighbors, India (Hermes et.aI2003).
Different programs and projects are involved in providing loans to the groups. Sometimes,
governments own and run these programs; in other cases international institutions, local and
foreign NGOs are involved in reaching poor borrowers. Group based lending works as follows.
Loans are made to individuals, but all members of the group are held responsible for the loan
repayment (joint liability principle) (Mehrteab, 2005).
Group lending involves the formation of groups of people who have a common wish to access
financial services. Under group lending, peer pressure and group guarantee, replace collateral.
The group guarantee involves the strict joint liability of group members. In case of any default of
any of the members, all group members are not given loan until the members have repaid the
loan totally. This calls for peer pressure from other members. The peer pressure acts as
repayment motives since the members do not want to let down other members of the group or
suffer any social sanction imposed on the group as a result of default. Default of a member may
lead to a group member losing their own savings to repay the loans. Because of this many
members prefer individual loans rather than being financially punished for the irresponsible
repayment of other group members (Sheilah, 2011).
The group lending is based on the elements that constitute its key factors of success. The first of
all is the self-selection of the group members that means the choice of members is done in a
freeway, personally, and without the influence of the loan officer. Thus, the group is responsible
for the choice ofhis/her members. The second is monitoring of projects. The second is obligation
of members to pay repayments Nevertheless; the money borrowers have limited choices to
oblige borrowers in delay to repay their credits (Bassem, 2008).
2.1.1 Approaches to Group Lending
Group lending programs can be subdivided into Solidarity Group approaches and Community-
Based Organization (CBO) approaches. The difference between the Solidarity Group approach
and CBO approach to group lending has to do with the anticipated future relationship between
the lending body and the borrower group. CBO approaches have as a main goal the eventual
independence of the borrower group from the lending body. To this end, the lending body
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inspires the development of the internal financial management capacity of the group, so that the
group can act as its own mini-bank. Solidarity Groups are those programs that do not anticipate
the eventual graduation of the borrower group from the lending institution. Participants are
considered long-term "clients" of the program (Brandt et.aI1996).
Group Lending
Grameen Bank Latin American
Solidarity Group
Sources- Brandt et al (1996)
Community-Managed Saving and Loan
Association (SLA)
l~
Village Banking Revolving Loan Funds (RLF)
2.1.2 Solidarity Group Lending Models
Solidarity Group lending model includes the Grameen model, the South American Solidarity
group model, and Village banking .These three models are explained as the following.
A) Grameen Bank.This model is based on group peer pressure where by loans are make to
individuals in groups for four to seven. Group members collectively guarantee loan
repayment, and access to succeeding loans is dependent on successful repayment by all
group members (Wrenn 2005 sited in Alemayehu 2008). According Mihreteab 2005 the
Grameen Bank borrowers are grouped voluntarily into groups of five and they take
training on how the credit program works and start saving before they apply for a loan. In
addition the new groups of borrowers meet and save for a minimum of four weeks before
any loans are issued. Loans go first to two members, then to another two, and then to the
fifth group member and the cycle of lending continue when the loan is totally repaid
(Tadesse 2007.The Grameen Bank does not require collateral from jts clients. If any
group member defaults on a loan, the other four members must cover the loan. If they do
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not do this, none of the other members will receive a loan until the non-performing loan
is repaid (Mihreteab 2005).
B) Latin American solidarity group lending. This is a Latin American version of the
Grameen Bank. It is the Banco Solidario (Bancosol) of urban Bolivian's pioneer of model
of lending. Like the Grameen Bank, it lends to groups, but its difference from Grameen
is, it forwards loans to all group members at once. It issues uncollateralized loans,
starting with small amounts of loans and frequent repayment. The repayment schedules
are flexible, and allows borrower to choose between weekly, fortnightly and monthly
repayments. The duration of payment is also flexible from one-month up to a year.Loan
amounts and terms gradually increase once clients have demonstrated that they are
capable of taking on larger loans. Future larger loans are depending on punctual and full
repayment of small initial loans (Mihreteab 2005).
C) Village banks (VBs).lt is originated in Latin America in the 1980s and over the years it has
been adopted in African and Asian countries. As the name indicates, it is a village-based and
community-managed credit and savings association established to provide access to financial
services in rural areas. Most of the time, donor-NGOs are active in setting up village financial
institutions in partnership with local groups. VBs are initially financed through loans provided by
a lending institution such as the Foundation for International Community Assistance
(FINCA)(Mihreteab 2005).The large group of villagers is subdivided into eight five person
groups, each with its own chairperson and the eight chairs in turn hand over their groups'
passbooks to the loan officer (Aghion and Morduch 2005).
2.1.2 Community-Based Organization (CBO) Approaches
Models of group lending which have as a primary goal the development of the internal financial
management capacity of the group are characterized as CBO models. CBO approaches aim to
develop a mini-bank, independent of the lending institution, owned and managed entirely by the
poor. Micro lending models using the CBO approach can be divided into two subgroups:
Community-Managed Loan Funds (CMLF) or saving and Loan Associations (SLA). The
distinction between CMLFs and SLAs is
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A) CMLFs receive initial funding from outside the organization (in the form of a loan or grant).
There are two main approaches to community-managed loan funds-Village Banking and
Revolving Loan Funds.
B) SLAs generate all funds internally (through member savings or retained interest) and receive
no external funding (Brandt et.a/1996).
A) Village Banking
Village Banking is probably the most practiced kind of Community-Managed Loan Fund. The
Village Banking methodology was developed by the Foundation for International Community
Assistance (FINCA), a U.S. based nonprofit organization that specializes in rural credit.
Programs using this methodology have been widely replicated in different parts of the world by
other NGOs. A Viilage Bank is initially financed through loans provided by a lending institution.
Over time, member savings, share capital and accumulated interest are expected to grow large
enough so that no external funding will be necessary (Brandt et. al, 1996).
B) Community-Managed Revolving Loan Funds (RLF)
The Community-Managed Revolving Loan Fund model is similar to the Village Bank model in
important ways. Both models use initial outside funding to work towards the goal of establishing
an independent and sustainable bank, run and managed by the local community. Outside funding
is channeled directly to the RLF, which then makes loans to individual members. A RLF group
typically consists of between 30 and 100 members, often women. Like the Village Bank model,
the RLF model requires members to save prior to the initial loan (Brandt et aI, 1996).
C) Savings and Loan Associations
A Savings and Loan Association (SLA) is very similar to a community managed loan fund with
one important distinction: funding for SLAs comes from member savings and equity
contributions only, and no outside funding is accepted. Savings and Loan Associations are
always entirely financially independent of outside institutions, even in the startup period.
Development institutions and NGOs may contribute technical assistance and training in the
startup period, but loans are always financed entirely by the member base (ibid).
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2.1.3 Advantages of Group-Based Lending
One of the expected advantages of group lending programs and joint liability is that since
this mechanism stimulates screening, monitoring and enforcement within the group, and
since it improves the effectiveness of these activities due to the fact that members live in the
same area and/or are socially tied, repayment of group loans will be higher (Hermes et.al
2003).The success of group lending in concession of credits to poor borrowers has been assigned
to its faculty to attenuate the asymmetry of information and enforcement problems that faces the
MFI in the individual micro lending. The ability of group lending institutions to conquer the
informational asymmetry and enforcement problems has been considered as the driving force
behind their supports to the poor, their sustainability, and their repayment performance (Bassem,
2008).
A) Peer pressure: - One important feature of group based lending is the use of peer pressure as
substitute for collateral.Many people presume that group guarantees involve the strict joint
liability of group members, members are seldom held responsible.The default of one
member generally means that further lending to other members of the group is stopped until
loan is repaid. (Tadesse 2007).
B) Reducing transaction costs: - Tadesse 2007 state that group lending reduces certain
institutional transactional costs by shifting all activities to the group MFI can reach many
numbers of clients. Self-selection is so important because the members of the same
community generally have excellent knowledge about who is a reliable credit risk and who
is not. The costs of screening and monitoring loans and costs of enforcing debt repayments
could be substantially reduced (Aghion and Morduch 2005).
C) Addresses information problems:-Group lendingcontract addresses the problems of
information imperfections that cause adverse section and moral hazard. (Tadesse 2007).
D) Mitigating Adverse Selection: -The adverse selection problem occurs when lenders cannot
distinguish inherently risky borrowers from safe borrowers.The fact that groups are enforced
to form on their own is the key to the solution; potential borrowers can then use their
information to find the best partners (ibid).
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2.1.4 Limits to Group Lending
Group lending institutions have better repayment rates than individual lending programs in good
years but worse repayment rates in years with some type of crisis. If several members of a group
encounter repayment difficulties the entire group often collapses, leading to domino effect. This
signals the inherent instability of group lending in risky environments (Tad esse 2007).
On the other hand, there are many theories that suggest that joint liability might not work as well
in practice. These critics argue that group liability mechanisms contain hidden costs for the
borrower, increase risks of collusion against the MFJ, and create deadweight loss in those cases
where "good" borrowers are excluded from future lending when the group defaults (Burton
2011).Mehreteab 2005 discussed group-based lending limitations and shortcomings as bellow.
A) Domino effect. In group-based lending programs the possibility of collusion of all members
not to repay cannot be ruled out. The very assumption of joint liability might make the decision
for or against loan repayment a strategic one that is taken by all borrowers. Apparently, a group
member will not be prepared to repay his loan if he expects other members to default, because if
this happens he will be denied access to additional credit or his share in making payments for
others increases. This is also called the domino effect.
B) Joint liability is not optimal. In group-based lending the joint liability contract is seen as the
main driving force for members to actively monitor and reinforce repayment. By cross-reporting
we mean that if group member i fail to repay, borrower j receives a harsh punishment only if
borrower i reports that borrower j is withholding some output from the lender. This allows an
unsuccessful borrower i to pressure j (the successful partner) to repay his/her loan if possible.
C) Limitations of social collateral. As is mentioned before, one of the key problems that led to
group-based lending is the poor lack any sizable physical assets that can be used as collateral in
enforcing repayment. Therefore, group-based lending programs rely on credit denial and social
sanctions in enforcing repayment and these alternatives are often grouped together and termed
social collateral.
D) Group size and free riding. The extent to which group-based lending can minimize the
asymmetry of information problem depends among other things on the optimal group size.
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E) Matching problems between demand and supply. Another negative influence on
repayment occurs when the credit terms and conditions are no longer appropriate for each
member, creating an inherent "matching problem" as group-based lending is repeated over time
(Paxton et.al 2000 cited in Mehreteab 2005). At the beginning of a lending program, borrowers
may be able to find group members with the same demand for loans and a similar supply, but the
probability of the same group desiring consecutive loans with similar loan amounts diminishes
over time (Mehreteab 2005).
2.1.4 Risks to Group Delivery Methodologies
Many of the MFIs practice solidarity and village banking methods to serve their clients. Group
lending methods are based on risk management that relies on peer pressure and the solidarity of
members who support each other. The strength of groups is evident when members, for example,
make payments for another member who may temporarily be unable to make their payments in
order to ensure that the group remains in good standing with the MFI and continues to receive
loans. However, when the burden of debt becomes too much for non-affected group members to
handle, this affects their ability to repay, affects group morale, and may lead to breakdown in
group cohesiveness, peer dynamics and guarantee mechanisms. Ultimately, it may lead to
increased attrition rates as the sick and weaker members are rejected from groups (Tadesse (MD,
MPH) et.aI2008).
2.1.5 Guidelines for effective use of groups
Tadesse Demissei 2007 lists the following guidelines for effective use of the groups
A. Groups are more effective if they are small and homogeneous.
B. Imposing group penalties and incentives (such as no access to further loan while an
individual is in default) improves loan performance
C. Loan sizes that increase sequentially appears to allow groups to screen out bad risks
D. Staggered disbursement to group members tan be based on the repayment performance
of other members.
OO~~681
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2.1.6 Group-based lending and repayment performance
Repayment of loans is an important measure for the success of these programs. In the long run,
programs may only survive if groups repay the loans they receive. Otherwise, the programs will
need continuous external financial support, which may not always be available. Moreover, low
repayment rates provide adverse incentives to groups to also not repay their loans (Paxton,et al
2000 sited in Hermes et.aI2003).Successful programs like Grameen Bank and Bancosol have
shown high repayment rates, as high as 90 to 95 percent of all loans made to groups. At the same
time, these programs are able to reach millions of poor borrowers. The high repayment
performance of these programs is attributed to their ability to curb problems arising from
asymmetry of information related to loan contracts (Hermes et.a12003 ).
2.2 Empirical Literature
Since the beginning work of Mohamed yenus (1976) the question on the effectiveness of group
lending in microfinance institution has been a major literature. After that many studies have been
conducted in both developed and developing countries to identifies the factor that have effects on
the successes or un successes (effectiveness of group lending).Based on the time constraint and
the number of empirical literature available on the related title of this research it will be quite
difficult to present the results of all researches. Therefore the empirical studies in this, on the
effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability will focus on those that have been
conducted after 1976's.
Ghatak (1999) undermine that a borrowers who cannot offer any collateral are asked to form
small groups which are jointly liable for the debts of each other .In addition to this he provides a
theory based on two contractual feature of group lending programs to explain why they (groups)
can potentially achieve high repayment rates despite the fact that the borrowers are not required
to put in any collateral. That is the existence of joint liability and the selection of group members
by themselves. In his study the high repayment rates of the group members show that the
effectiveness of the group lending and its impact on profitability. Because when the group pays
their loan on time and the loan they borrow it is effective to both parties (borrowers & lenders).
Sharma and Zeller (1996) use data of 128 groups from four group-based lending programs
in Bangladesh to study the determinants of repayment. They use a number of variables that
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may measure screening, monitoring and enforcement activities within groups. Their results
show the following. First, the repayment problems increase when there are more relatives
in the same group. This help their hypothesis that screening, monitoring and enforcement
among relatives does not take place or at least is less effective, since relatives may more easily
collude against the program and delay repayment. Second, if borrowers are more credit rationed
this increases repayment performance. Their result can be taken as evidence for the fact
that group members have more motivations to screen, monitor and enforce if they have no other
credit sources. Third, groups that were formed using a self-selection process show good
repayment ability.
Bassem (2008) discussed with the use of a logit model the internal and external delinquency of a
self-designed survey of 208 groups of credit. His result of estimation shows that the repayment is
influenced positively by the internal rule of conduct, the same business, the knowledge of the
members before formation of the group, peer pressure, the self- selection, sex, the educational
level and the non-financial services. In contrast to this the homogeneity and the marital status are
among the main factors acting negatively on the repayment performance which can determine
the effectiveness of the group lending and its impact on profitability of the microfinance
institutions.
In support to Bassem (2008) Paxton et.al (1996) stated that by based on the successes of
Grameen Bank showed that, there is possibility to provide money to a number of low income
people with financial services by using a group methodology. In their study peer pressure and
group solidarity are used as instrument to gain high repayments. As well as urban ,homogenous
group, good leadership & training and history in groups had the more probability of loan
repayment .Besides to these the credit terms, creating inherent (matching problem) as group
lending is repeated over time reduces the repayment of loan. All variables that have a positive
and negative impact on loan repayment performance have their own impact on effectiveness or
in effectiveness of group lending directly or indirectly. To measure the relevance of positive and
negative, the researchers accomplish a survey of 140 groups in Bangladish.
To the help of the above Wydick (2000) showed that the threat of group credit insurance, social
sanctions against groups members who misallocate borrowed of group lending mitigates some
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risky investment behavior. At the same time he found out that group lending imposes significant
costs to borrowers over individual lending.
Hermes et.al (2003) with using data from an extensive questionnaire held in Ertirea among
participants of 102 groups they showed that the social ties of the group leader do have a positive
effect on repayment performance of groups .In opposite to it is not true for social ties of other
group members . As well as they suggest that the two ways on the issues addressed in their
paper. The First way is the methodology proposed, separately look at the group leader and other
group members when it comes to monitoring and enforcement activities should also be applied
for other programs in other countries to generalize the results of the study. Second way is the
theoretical as well as empirical studies could verify whether the delegated monitoring model is
superior not terms of reducing repayment problems as compared to other group based lending
practices. From this study there are different variables that have impacts on the effectiveness of
the group lending and its impact in many ways. The variables that used by him are the same to
the other researchers. Among them, length of time for loan, rate of interest number of members
and etc. with the help of logit model to analyze his results.
Baland (2010) described microfinance lending has benefited millions of borrowers. MFls have
promoted their impact among the very poor and at recent favored individual contracts than group
contracts. Their work understand by using model, there is a single investment project and access
to credit is limited by weak repayment incentives and absence of large social sanctions, the
poorest borrowers are offered individual and not group contracts. In contrast to the individual
contracts the compered profit from group loans are shown to be decreased in loan size. Also they
explored the benefit effects of group size and requiring small loans are better served by larger
groups but group size effects are ambiguous. For their investigation they use different variables
which help them to achieve their findings. The variables the used are loan size social sanction by
the members and by the bank and other variables the same with the others (researchers). The
study motivated by common observation that group loans with joint liability appear better
comforts for the moderately poor than very poor. This is true by identifying how repayment rates
and credit contracts vary by loan amount. The study builds on the standard approach in the
literature of group lending. With this framework they arrived on that for a given investment
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project, poorer borrowers face a higher cost of capital under joint liability and gaining from
group lending increasing in initial borrower wealth.
Jemal (2003) conducted study at OCSSCO kuyu wereda of North showa of oromiya with the aim
of analyzing the factors that influence microfinance loan repayment, evaluating the loan
rationing mechanism and also assessing the impact of program on the living standard of
borrowers by the help of primary data through structured questionnaire. In his study his
estimations results of the descriptive statistics and the probit model show that the variables such
as education, income, loan supervision, suitability of repayment period, availability of other
credit sources and livestock are important and significant factors that increases the loan
repayment performance, but loan diversion and loan size are assessed as the factors that
decreases the loan repayment performance. Jemal study sex's influence on the repayment
performance of repayment in both ways. i' e the female borrowers are better while males are not
good in repayment of loan as females. In general the literature written in this chapter describes
about the repayment performance of the borrowers which help the researcher to identify the
effectiveness of the group or ineffectiveness of it and its impact on profitability.
Zeller (1996) state group lending has received much attention in recent years because of its
perceived potential in providing financial services to poor households that lack traditional
collateral. The analysis focuses on the effects of program design, community and group
characteristics on the repayment performance of groups, using a data set on groups from six
different lending programs in Madagascar. The results show that socially unified groups pool
risks by misusing the members' asset that their repayment performance is improved even in
communities with high-risk exposure.
Okurut et.al (2009) investigated on the key factors influence loan repayment performance among
group clients of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Tanzania. The study was based on a sample
of 150 respondents in kariakoo division ofDar es salaam, Tanzania. In the study the logit model
was used. The model regression model results showed that experience, training time and
sanctions have positive and significant effects on loan repayment performance among group
clients of MFls. This is the sign of the effectiveness of group lending and it has effect on
profitability. In opposite to this the study shows that transaction cost and group size have
negative and significant effect on loan repayment performance. This negativity of the two
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variables contributes to the default of the group which has its own effect on the effectiveness of
group lending and its impact on profitability.
Godquin (2004) discussed the result by the result by the help of probit model as, microfinance
programs are a key element of poverty alleviation strategy through different lending
methodologies such as group lending, nonfinancial services and dynamic incentives as means to
alleviate poverty. In this the explanatory power of theoretical model that attribute the
performance of MFIs in terms of repayment to the use of such financial innovations has tested.
The result described that group homogeneity and the age of the group have a negative impact on
the repayment performance that determine the success of group lending. That is at this time the
groups become ineffective and negatively affect the profitability ofthe group lending.
2.3 Conclusion and knowledge gap
This chapter reviews the literature on group lending starting with the famous relevance of
Mohamed Yunus Grameen Bank of 1976 in Bangladesh. Group lending is an arrangement of
individuals without collateral who get together and form groups with the aim of obtaining loans
from a lender (Li et.a/ 2009). Non-repayment by the group means that all borrowers in the
group will be denied future access to loans from the program. In this way, group lending
creates incentives for individual group members to screen and monitor the other members of the
group and to enforce repayment, because each individual wants to reduce the risk of having to
contribute to the repayment of loans of other members and since he/she wants to ensure access to
future loans (Hermes et.a/2003).
Under group lending, peer pressure and group guarantee, substitute collateral. The group
guarantee involves the strict joint liability of group members. In case of any default of any of the
members, all group members are stopped loan until the members have completely repaid the loan
(Sheilah, 2011). In some programs loans are given strictly for a certain period of time (usually a
year), while in other programs the members are allowed to decide the loan terms themselves.
Repayments are made on a weekly or monthly basis; this is done at group meetings or directly to
the branches of the microfinance institution. Nowadays, worldwide many programs use group-
based lending to forward loans to the poor (Mehrteab 2005).
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Similarly, the findings of prior have provided varying evidence related to the group lending
regarding. For instance, Sharma and Zeller (1996) have studied theRepayment Performance in
Group-Based Credit Programs in Bangiladesh. In addition to this in neighbor country at Ereterea
there are many researches on group lending but not regarding to the effectiveness of group
lending and its impact on profitability. In Ethiopia, Jemal (2003) studied the Microfinance and
Loan Repayment Performance at OCSSCO of oromiya in kuyyu woreda. However, As to the
knowledge of the researcher there is no study conducted on the effectiveness of group
lending and its impact on profitability in MFI especial reference to jimrna zone. Therefore, this
study will fill the gap by examining the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on
profitability in ocsso of j imma zone of oromiya.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3. INTRODUCTION
The second chapter tried to discuss the literature review along with the knowledge gap that this
study had been filling. This third chapter present the research methodology along with the
detailed methods planned to be used in the study. In this section, the research concentrated
on the method adopted throughout the study. First, the study area, target population survey
design, types and nature of the data, method and instrument of data collection, sampling
technique, sample size determination, and data discussions as well as presentations.
3.1. The Study Area
The study on the assessment of the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability
has under taken in Jimam zone ofOromia regional state which is located at 345 km south west of
the Addis Ababa. It's a special Zone of the Oromia Region. It has a latitude and longitude of
7°40'N 36050'E. The Jimma city was the capital of Kaffa province up to the province was
dissolved. In the early 1960s it was the greatest market in all of southwestern Ethiopia. Jimma is
named by King Aba Jifar. Similarly Jimma city was taken as a Centre of commercial starting
from the very beginning of 18th century. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jimma jan,2014).
3.2 Research Methods and Data source
3.2.1 Data source and data collection technique
The study was made by the use of primary data. The primary data to be generated include
characteristics of borrowers, loan size, age of borrowers, marital states of the users, and etc. The
researcher used instruments as self-administered questionnaires and semi-structured interviews
to collect primary data from the respondents.
3.2.2 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure
This study had two components of respondents and two sample populations. The group lending
effectiveness and its impact on profitability survey done on 252 samples of group borrowers and
have a sample of Four OCSSCO workers ( especially branch manager) for interview. A two
stages sampling technique had been used to draw sample from the population. In the first stage,
fourworedaswill be randomly selected among 16 worcdas among the woredas that OCSSCO has
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a branch within the zone. In the second stage, 252 group borrowers had been randomly drawn
from each of the four woredas these woredas are Karsa, Mana, Sakka cokorsa and Gomma
woreda. This made the total sample for the survey to be 256. This sample size is determined by
using the thumb rule of sample size determination. To determine sample size the researcher used
the following formula, by assuming that 11 =0.5. That is in the absence of specific information
about 11 or (J effect size of 0 could be 0.5 that is the medium one to survey sampling
determination.
16 16
n= !J.2 or n = 6/0' (Allen Jr 2011).
Where n = the sample size and
11= variance
16 16 =64Therefore, n- - --- 0.52 0.25
Based on the above description and result, the researcher multiplied the result by number of the
woredas randomly selected. So the result is 64*4=256. The 64 respondents among the woredas
are selected by the stratified or quota randam sampling.
'-- _ J'-. --.,
3.3 Method of Data Analysis and presentation
The study used both descriptive statistics and econometric regression analysis to deal with the
research questions and thus achieve the objectives.
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive measures had been employed to examine, describe, and compare the lender and
borrower function, socio-economic characteristics of the borrowers, role of internal rule, loan
officer's activities, peer pressure and age and others. In the descriptive analysis dataset the data
had been analyzed through percentage and table, graphs, charts, pie charts used to present the
data. As well as the researcher used statistical package for social sciances 16.0 version
(SPSS 16.0) software for data analysis. The results of the analysis of descriptive statistics
percentage reported give information about the variables under investigation. Also, in order to
examine the possible degree of Multicollinearity among the regresses, correlation matrixes of the
variables of the study have been calculated. The correlation statistics is helpful to gain initial
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insight regarding the relationship between the variables used in the study. The researcher has used
dummy variables to measure how the group lending is effective and its impact on profitability.
3.3.2 Econometric Analysis
In the analysis of binary response Logit model is a parametric lead practice. Many researchers
apply the Logit model routinely to analyze binary data. Maddala 1987 states that for the analysis
of the fixed effects model, the Logit model is the appropriate one. The reason of choosing of
Logit in the fixed effects cannot be justified by anything but convenience. Also Amemiya 1985
identify a major justification for the log it model is that the logistic distribution function is similar
to the normal distribution function but has a simpler form. In the logit model the errors are
assumed that the standard logistic. The Logit model used in order to avoid the problem
encountered by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model such as, the marginal effects are linear in
parameters, there is heterocedasticity, OLS might predict values below zero and above one
(Truglia, 2008). Based on the above advantage and other specification the researcher used the
Logit model.
Based on the variables in Paxton the principal previously specified where repayment is a
function of the processes repayment, which shows the effectiveness of the group and impact of
the group effectiveness on profitability. In addition to the variables specifically given in their
model (such as group homogeneity, group solidarity, and etc.) additional variables that have been
supported by other theoretical and empirical research had been added to the variables influencing
loan repayment, which show the ineffectiveness or effectiveness of group (Training, location
factors, and experience working in groups, age, sex, opportunity of other source family size, land
size and so on). If the repayment problem (the sign of the group's ineffectiveness) is high, the
individual may determine to solve the problem by him/herself so that others in the group do not
get angry on him/ her. If the individual has confidence in the group or no other preparation is
possible, he/ she may report the problem to the group. It is then the intragroup contract that
determines whether or not the loan is repaid, that is the group lending is effective (succeed) and
has impact on profitability based on their determination. By incorporating each of these
variables, the model is capable of showing what influences are the most important in identifying
the group's lending effectiveness and its impact on profitability. The model is flexible enough to
use data sets from woredas of the zone. Several stages in the repayment process which show the
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successful or group lending is effective and it has impact on profitability of the group exist. First,
the individual mayor may not have problems repaying the loan that help in identifying the
effectiveness of the group lending and its impact on profitability. If he/she does, he/she must
decide whether to solve the problem independently or tell the group. If the group finds out about
the problem, group peer pressure and group solidarity may affect whether or not the loan is
repaid that will differentiate the group lending is effective and it has impact on profitability.
Based on the above variables, if the cumulative distribution of f.! is logistic it can be necessary
what is known as the logit model. In this case
exp(z.)
F (Z1) = 1 + exp(z.) (3. 1)
Hence;
F(Zt)log = z•......................................................................(3.2)
1-F(Zt) -
Note that for the legit model
log.EL = Po -{- L]~=i Pl' Xi]'" (3.3)
1-pt
The left hand side of this equation is called the log-odds ratio. Thus the log- odds ratio is a linear
function of the explanatory variables. So the study had been conducted by using the Logit model
that has a regression model of
k
J' Lpjxij + 11 .. · (3.4)
j=1
"xij"
is dependent variables,
is explanatory variables and
is error term.
Where "y"
In this, what had been observed is a dummy variable "y" defined by:-
Y=1 if Y> 0 and
y = 0 if otherwise (Maddala, 1992).
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3.4 Explanatory Variables
In this section of this chapter the Explanatory variables of the study are discussed as under
bellow.
The following Explanatory variables are followed from the Paxton (1996) of the experience of
Burcinafaso and other countries of the world.
Other source of borrowing Groups with more outside borrowing opportunities will have
access to higher loan size giving group members greater incentive for risky projects. However,
outside credit options can also be signals of credit quality, sound economic conditions in the
area, etc. The expected sign on outside credit options would therefore be ambiguous. The
measure of outside borrowing options is the percentage of group members who have access to
credit from individuals outside the group. From this the other source of borrowing may have
negative relationship with the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability.
Age: -At younger age, people are likely to be at career stages where higher future incomes are
expected. It may also be argued that the growth rate of income increases in the early stage of the
earning life cycle but then declines, as one gets older. On the other side, at older age a borrower
may acquire stability, may gain a lot of experience in running a business or may feel a sense of
more responsibility hence could be positively related to loan recovery. Therefore it will be
difficult to hypothesis the sign.
Education: - the educational Background of the group ranges from illiterate to tertiary. It is
assumed that as the lender gets educated, they could acquire more knowledge so that their
efficiency in allocation of resources increases and so does the proper utilization of the loan. Their
ability to adopt themselves to changing situation would be better than the illiterate ones; hence it
would have positive relation with effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability.
Sex:- Most studies attach positive sign to females in relation to repayment that show the
effectiveness of group lending arguing that female borrowers feel more responsibility to their
families than male. In opposite to this the researcher was hypothesized that lending to male is
effective and has impact on profitability.
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Training:- Training may avoid problems from emerging and may teaching groups to develop a
stronger intragroup contract, leading to better group lending effectiveness and its impact on
profitability. The program may train groups very effectively so that they learn how to create a
system of contingent contracts to obtain or cover the repayment of an individual experiencing
problem which is the indicator ofthe effectiveness of group. Therefore the training may have the
positive sign on the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability.
Screen:-The variable screen is a dichotomous variable that equals "I" if the group has screen the
group to reject a person who wanted to join and "2"otherwise. The variables screen is meant to
measure the ability of group members to exclude members from joining the group. These
variables contain information about group members at the moment the group is being formed.
This may have a positive relationship with the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on
profitabi lity.
Distance The average distance between one group members and other groupmembers. Since the
distance of the group member has both positive and negative impact on profitability the sign
cannot be determined before the study.
Peer pressure: - Peer pressure measures the group members' willingness to influence the in
effective partners (groups). Peer pressure may have positivesign on the effectiveness of group
lending and its impact on profitability.
Social ties reflect the degree of homogeneity/connectivity among the group members. Based on
this the social ties may have positive sign on the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on
profitability.
Loan officer visit/ pressure: - analysis how the loan officer /staff visit the group.
Family size if the group member has large household size, a considerable amount of income
from the project could be diverted away from loan repayment which is the sign of group
ineffectiveness and had no profitability to household consumption. Therefore, the sign is
expected to be negative.
Land Size identifying theland size ofthe borrowers, and its impact on the effectiveness of group
lending and its impact on profitability.
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Loan Diversion:- If the borrower diverted to more productive use than the intended project,
then it will have a positive impact. However the borrower (group member) diverted it to unviable
projects it will have a negative impact. Thus it all depends on their performance of the project the
loan is diverted to. Therefore the sign of the variable can't be predetermined.
Group size: - to identify that the size of the group does have influence on the effectiveness of
the group lending and its impact on profitability.
Internal rule and conduct it identifies the effect of rule and conduct on the effectiveness of
grouplending and its impact on profitability. The researcher assumed that it has positive impact
on the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability
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CHAPTER FOUR
FINDINGS, DATA PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATIONS
4.1. Introduction
In this part the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability and the result
obtained by using the methods of logistic regression estimation and descriptive statistic with the
help of SPSS 16.0 version. This includes the result test of correlation and Hosmer and
Lemeshow model fitness test among the variables.
The survey was conducted by distributing questionnaires to OCSSCO group based borrower and
interview was held with OCSSCO woreda's branch managers. From the total 252 questionnaires
intended to be collected from OCSSCO group based borrower, only 203 (81 % response rate)
questionnaires were effectively collected and analyzed. In order to have interpretive data, in
some sort of quantitative sense, the researcher constructed the close-ended questions in the form
of "Yes" -"No" with items to be chosen as their possible reasons for their responses and items
having four points to be rated ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" (likert scale)
with the suggested values which run through one to four. Open-ended questionnaire and its
major purpose were to give opportunity to the respondents to express their feeling, perceptions
and intentions related to the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability. The
questionnaires distributed to the OCSSCO group based borrower with an English and Afan
Oromo version so as to avoid language barriers and minimize response biases due to
misunderstanding. The following table summarizes about the respondents which was taken
proportionally.
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Table 4.1 Respondents Taken proportionally from woredas.
OCCSCO group based borrower Sample Percentage Number of Percentage
size respondents
Sample woreda (%)
who provide
(%)
their reply
64 25 50 24.60
Kersa wereda
Seka chokorsa woreda 64 25 47 23.50
Mana woreda 64 25 52 25.60
Gomma woreda 64 25 54 26.60
Total 256 100 203 100
Source: survey of pJ14)
The selected sample size of this study was 252 and 4 OCSSCO group based borrower and branch
manager of the OCSSCO respectively for whom questionnaire distributed and interviewed. Out
of these, 203 from group based borrower were returned the questionnaires and 4 branch manager
interviewed. The information obtained from document analyses used as a complementary data
for analysis.
Figure 4.1 the marital states of the respondent.
marital states
.P'>g18
mmatlied
Odivo<ced
• widowed
Source: survey of (2014)
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The above figurc.4.1 shows that the responding group members are married by 150 (73.9 %) of
the respondents. While the rest of the respondents are; single, divorced and widowed with the
count of28 (13.8%), 16 (7.9%) and 9 (4.4%) respectively. The groups that are formed with the
married group member are influential on the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on
profitability than the other group formed that is single, divorced and widowed. This is because
the married people are worry and think for their family future life.
Table 4.2 shows the social ties of the group member
Items 1-18 years 19 -36 37-55 Above 56 Total
vears vears vears
Years the group member lived the 33(16.3%) 72(35.5%) 56(27.6%) 42(20.7% 203(100%)
same area )
Who initiated the group formation Members Group Credit 203(100%)
them selves leader officer
123(60.6%) 42(20.7%) 38(18.7%)
How well did you know the Good Hardily Not at all
member before formed this group.
113(55.7%) 47(23.2%) 43(21.1%) 203(100%)
Participated in other group Yes 53(26.1%) 203(100%)
No 150(73.9%
Source: Survey data (2014)
This table depicted that the group member have lived around the same area with 33(16.3%),
72(35.5%) 56(27.6%) and 42(20.7%) for the years 1-18 years, 19-36years, 37-55 years and
above 56 years respectively. This show that the majority of the group member lived in the same
area for 19-36 years which contains 72(35.5%) of the respondents of the study. Since the group
member have lived in the same area for long period of time the groups living at the same around,
their impact on the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability is very high.
This is because of the group know detail about each other in all cases. For the question who
initiated the formation of the group 123 (60.6%) of the respondents said that the formation is
initiated by themselves while the rest of them 42(20.7%) and 38(18.7%) of them said that it is
initiated by the group leader and credit officer respectively. So the group formation is initiated by
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the group members themselves the group effectiveness and its impact on profitability
encouraged. The group members who do not know at all the group member accept the group
member because of he/she is the relative of the other group members, he/she is a friend of other
group members and his/her business looks good. Other controlling variable under social ties is
that participating in other group before participate in this group. The answer to this question
given by the respondents is No by 150(73.9%) of the group members did not participate in other
group and 53(26.1%) of the respondents participate in other group member before they become
the member of the recent of his/her group. They leaved their previous group because of the first
group do not have an agreement on their business activities, loan repayment, benefit sharing and
not equally struggle for the effectiveness of the group lending and its impact on profitability of
their group.
Table 4.3 shows the group ever refused loan from financial institution
Items Yes No Never applied Total
Has any bank /some other
lending institution ever
refused you loan
37(18.2%) 24(11.8%) 142(70.0%) 203(100%)
Source: Survey dab, (2014)
The table 4.3 shows that the group ever refused loan from financial institution. For any
bank/lending institution ever refused you loan the majority ofthe respondents with an account of
142 (70%) never applied for loan because the respondents never consider that they can get loan
from other that is banks and other institution because they think that they cannot get loan from
them for the reason of the group borrowers do have a loan of OCSSCO of Jimma zone. The
remaining of the respondents are refused with 37(18.2%) of the total respondents. They are
refused because they do not have enough collateral, do not know as they can get from banks &
other lending institutions and there is no consignor. Plus the respondents are not refused to the
loan from the banks/ other lending institution with the respondents of 24(11.8%). So in general
the group members did not apply for any bank/lending institution to got loan from them. This has
its own contribution to the group effectiveness and its impact on profitability.
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Table 4.4 shows the solidarity of the group
Items Yes No Do not remember Total
Have you had credit default 139 (68.5%) 61 (30%) 3 (1.5%) 203(100%)
in repaying your debt in the
current loan cycle
Do you have help from your Yes No
group members to pay your
credit 148(72.9%) 55(27.1%) 203(100%)
Source: Survey data, (2014)
As can be observed from table 4.4 above among 203 respondents 61 (30%) replied that they do
not have had problems of credit default in the current loan cycle. As per findings, majority 139
(68.5%) of the respondents said that they do have had problems of credit default in their current
loan cycle while the remaining 3(1.5%) of the respondents do not remember whether they had
problems of credit default in the current loan or not. So that since the group member had a
problem of credit default the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability is
decreased. The majority of the respondents who face the problems of credit default list their
reasons of defaults in the current loan cycle profit loss with the majority respondents of 65
(46.76%) among those face the problem of paying their current loan, 17 (12.23%) of them said
that their unable to pay the credit is due to the natural disaster problem, while the rest of the
respondents 40 (28.78%), 10 (7.19%) and 7 (5.04%) of them cannot pay their credit because of
competition was though among the competitor, death of family member and illness of family
member respectively. It can be concluded that the group members face the problem of paying
their current loan because the market competition is though among the competitors.
While the respondents who do not have had the problems of credit default of their current loan
said that they did not face the problem because of the groups get the loan for short period of time
that is for 2-3 rounds, at that time they encouraged each other and think for the future access of
loan they pay their credit. During this the group lending effectiveness and its impact on
profitability can be showed by the group borrower. Also for the survey question do you have
help from your group members to pay your credit, the respondents with the size of 148(72.9) said
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that they got help from their colleagues. Based on this the group members got help from their
colleagues. The help they got from their colleagues are money to pay their credit default and
moral supports as they are jointly liable for their credit as the respond from the respondents plus
the group member helped averagely by 3 of the group members. And the other of the group
member that is 55(27.1 %) said that they did not got help from their group member because ofthe
group member by him/herself can pay the credit default happened by the group's member.
Table 4.5 shows the loan diversification
Item Total
Has anyone member of Yes 64(31.5%)
your group member
misused loans No 139(68.5%) 203(100%
How it affect your group Badly Somewhat Strongly Not at all
business bad bad
64(100%)
17(26.7%) 15(23.4%) 21(32.8%) 11(17.2%)
Source: survey of (2014)
Table 4.5 shows the responding, the group member did not misuse the loan they got from
OCSSCO of Jimma zone. The group member used the loan for the purpose of they borrowed it.
So the effectiveness of the group lending and its impact on profitability is increased as the group
member did not misused the loan they got. The respondents did not misused the loan they
borrowed with the respondents of 139 (68.5%) and 64 (31.5%) of them misused the loan
borrowed for other purpose such as personal consumption, to buy exercise books and uniforms to
their children. Hence the borrowed money from the OCSSCO by the group members is not
misused by the group members, the effectiveness of group lending and its impact can be
increased. For the question how it affects the business of the group, the respondents said that
badly, somewhat bad, strongly bad and not at all with respondents of 26.6 % (17), 23.4 % (15),
32.8 % (21) and] 7.2 % (11) respectively. From this it can be generalized that the misused loan
affects the business of the group strongly bad by the respondents of 32.8 % (21) among the
respondents. When the group member's business affected by the misuse of the loan they
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borrowed, the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability decreased
immediately.
The group member who misused loan pay their credit by themselves and sometimes the whole
group member pay the credit when member totally enable to pay his/her credit. This is because
the other group member worried about the effectiveness of the group lending and its impact on
profitability as well as the group members put the reasons why they pay their credits, Because,
he/she highly value the future access of loans from the program, Because he/she wants to settle
his /her debt, Because he/she wants to fulfill his/her moral obligation towards the group and
Because he/she wants to stay on good terms with other group member with the account of
17(26.56%),20 (31.25%), 11 (17.19%) and 16 (25%) respectively.
Therefore it can be concluded that the group member pay their loan because of settle his/her debt
he/she got from the OCSSCO. In directly this influence the group to be effective and has impact
on profitability of the group member.With the regard ofloan size the group member got the loan
amount 2000 birr averagely with the respondent of 66.5% (135) of the group member got loan
between 800 birr to 2000 birr averagely, and the other ofthem got between 2100 birr to 3400 birr
averagely and more than 3500 birr with the account of 30.05 %(61) and 3.45% (7) of the
respondents respectively. So the group member got small amount of loan that is between 800 birr
to 2000 birr that enable them to pay their credit and to be effective and has impact on
profitability of the group. The group member strongly disagree with the respondents of 104
(51%) as the loan increase the group member continuing together in their group and 58 (29.1%),
24 (12%) and 17 (7.9%) of the respondents are disagree, agree and highly agree as the loan
increase the group member is continuing together in their group respectively. Then the group
member did not continuing together as the loan amount increases from OCSSCO to the group,
this is because the group member that got high amount of loan want to activate his/her own
business rather than with the group members.
The managers of the OCSSCO at woreds told that the group that borrowed less money are
effective than those who borrowed high amount of money. This is in case of paying their default
and got again the loan from the institution that isfrom ocssco. So the institution gives the less
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amount loans to group member to control the group member credit default and made the group
effective and has impact on profitability.
4.2 Impact of group lending on profitability
In this study when the researcher talks about group lending impact on profitability, it is tried to
talk about the group member's profit under their group formed and got loan from the OCSSCO
of Jimma zone of oromiya. That is changes in the group member's life style under his /her group
formed and loan gained from the OCSSCO.
Table 4.6 shows the impact of group lending under group and got loan.
Items Yes No Total
Do you have profit under the 191(94.1%) 12(5.9%) 203(100%)
group formed and got loan.
Source: - survey of(2014)
As can be depicted from the above table the respondents said that they have profit under the
formed (joined) gTOUpand borrowed money from OCSSCO of Jimma zone, with the count of
94.1 % (191) of the respondents of the survey held at OCSSCO of Jimma zone. While the rest of
the respondents with 12 (5.9%) said that they are not profited under the group and lend money
from the OCSSCO. The groups that are not profited from their group are because their group is
in effective and does not impact on profitability. So the groups are profitable from the group
formed and loan borrowed. Groups in impact on profitability are because the group cannot pay
their loan borrowed from OCSSCO as reason listed in the previous section. Those groups (that
is those who are benefited) from the group formed and lending have the slogan of "WLQO KOO
QORICHA RAKKOO KOO!" which to mean that "MY OCSSCO TO MY PROBLEM" because
those group are leave out from their problem with the help of the credit they got from OCSSCO.
Also the managers support that the group based borrower are profitable from their group and
got loan from their microfinance institution that is OCSSCo. Plus they respond that the group
lending has impact on the profitability of groups in case of changing their life style in the way of
sending their child to school, changing their house from thatched house to iron sheet house and
changed their house furniture.
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Figure 4.2 shows that the group member sends their children to school more than the usual
100
As can be observed from figure 4.2 out of the profited group from the group lending respondents,
95 (49.74%) replied as they highly agree that they send their children to school more than they
did before they formed and got loan from OCSSCO and 84 (44%) answered as they agree that
they send their children to school than they send before they formed under group and lend from
OCSSCO. While t;le rest that is 10 (5.24%) and 2(1.05%) of them said that they are disagree and
highly disagree as they did not send their children to school more than they are sending their
children to the school before they form group and got credit from OCSSCO. So the group
profited from their group by sending their child to the school after they are under group and got
loan. Those who disagree and highly disagree is because the most of them (those who disagree
and highly disagree about the benefit they got after they formed group and got loan from the
OCSSO of Jimma zone) are infant and at the beginning of activating their business.
80
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Source: - survey of study (2014)
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Figure 4.3 shows the group member changed their house furniture.
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As can be depicted from figure 4.3 out of the profited group members from the group lending
respondents, 77 (~0.31%) replied as they highly agree that they changed their house furniture
such as table, chair, bed and the like than they did had after they formed and got loan from
OCSSCO and 100(52.36%) answered as they agree that they changed their house furniture such
as table, chair bed and the like than they did had before than they do had after they formed under
group and lend from OCSSCO. While the rest that is 12 (6.28%) and 1(0.52%) of them said that
they are disagree and highly disagree respectively as they did not changed their furniture such as
table, chair, bed and the like more than they had before they formed the group the group and got
the loan with.their group members from OCSSCO. From this the group member got profit by
changing their house furniture under the group they formed and got loan. The group member
those disagree/highly disagree is because the most of them (those who disagree and highly
disagree about the benefit they got after they formed group and got loan from the OCSSO of
Jimma zone) are infant and at the beginning of activating their business.
agree
Source:-survey of (2014)
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Figure 4.4 shows the group member changed their house from thatched to iron sheet.
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Source: - survey of (2014)
As can be looked from figure 4.4 out of the profited group from the group lending respondents,
95 (48.77%) replied as they highly agree that they changing their house from thatched house to
iron sheet (tin) after they formed group and got loan from the OCSSCO and 90(46.31%)
answered as they agree that they changed their house from thatched house to iron sheet (tin) after
they formed group and got loan from the OCSSCO. It can be said that the group members are
"
profitable with t~<~change of their house from thatch to iron sheet. While the rest that is 6
(4.93%), and 1(0,~%) of them said that they are disagree and highly disagree as they did not
changed their hou'~'e from thatched house to iron sheet (tin) after they formed group and got loan
from the OCSSCO. This is because the most of them (those who disagree and highly disagree
about the benefit they got after they formed group and got loan from the OCSSO of j imma zone)
are infant and at the beginning of activating their business.
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Figure 4.5 shows the group member going health service more than before.
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Source: - survey of (2014)
As can be observed from figure 4.5 out of the profited group from the group lending respondents,
100 (53.69%) replied as they highly agree that they going to healthy service after they formed
under group and got loan from oesseo than before they formed the group and got loan with
the group member and 75 (38.42%) said as they agree that they going to healthy service after
they join under group and got loan from oesseo of Jimma zone of Oromia than they did not
grouped and did not got loan from oesseo. While the remaining that is 15 (7.39%) and
1(0.5%) of them said that they are disagree and highly disagree as they did not going to healthy
service after they formed under group than they used furniture such as table, chair, bed and the
others before .they form group and got credit from oesseo. This is because the most of them
(those who disagree and highly disagree about the benefit they got after they formed group and
got loan from the oesso of Jimma zone) are infant and at the beginning of activating their
business. Then the group members are profited by going to health service under the group they
formed and got loan from oesseo of Jimma zone.
40
4.3 Econometric regression analysis
The model contains one dependent variable and fifteen independent variables and constant term.
The binary logestic regression method is used to come up with the econometric results. For the
test statistics 10% (0.1) significant level is used to reject or not to reject the null hypothesis. The
first test the researcher test isHosmer and Lemeshow model fitness test because they are the
means to know whether the model is valid or not to continue with the regression. Accordingly,
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients and collinearity test were tested and the results are
presented at the appendixes of the study. As these tests prove the validity of the model, the study
had continued into regression analysis and hypothesis testing.
Logistic regression was used (Equation 3.4) to investigate the effectiveness of group lending and
its impact on profitability among the OCSSCO borrowers. The maximum likelihood estimation
technique was used. Tables 4.7 present the results of the logistic model for OCSSCO borrowers.
Table 4.7 shows that predicted influencing factors were statistically significant at (Chi-Square =
175.838, P-Value = 0.000,89 degrees of freedom, Nagelkerke R Square (R) = 0.774 and Cox &
Snell R Square (R2) = 0.579). The estimated coefficients were statistically different from zero
variously at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. Overall, the logistic model
successfully predicted factors contributing to the effectiveness of the group lending and its
impact on profitability of OCSSCO borrowers.
4.3.1 Hosmer and Lemeshow model goodness of fit
The Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) test for logistic regression is widely used to answer the question
"How well does the model fit the data?" R2 is a measure of predictive power, that is, how well
can predict the dependent variable based on the independent variables. That may be an important
concern, but it doesn't really address the question of whether the model is consistent with the
data. By contrast, goodness-of-fit (GOF) tests help to decide whether the model is correctly
specified or not. Hosmer and Lemeshow produce ap-value-if it's low (below .05), the model is
rejected. If it's high, then the model passes the test (Allison, 2013). Based on the above evidence
the model the researcher used is fitted with the chi-square of 4.387, degree of freedom 8 and
significance level of 0.821.
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4.3.2 Correlation test
Correlation is a way to which two or more variables are associated with or related to each other.
The matrixes are 'two, providing information on the degree of relationship between dependent
and independents variables or independent and independent variables using Pearson correlation
(Gujarati, 2004). To say there is multicollinearity problem when there is correlation
between variables employed in the regression model (when the assumption that cov(x1,x2) = 0 is
violated). That is the existence of a "perfect" or exact linear relationship among some or all
explanatory variables of a regression model (Gujarati, 1995). The intercorrelation between the
two variables can be measured by the partial correlation coefficient between one variable with
another variable. As a rule of thumb, if the correlation coefficient between the two variables is
greater than 0.8, one can conclude that there is a series problem of multicollinearity.
Accordingly the test result shows that the correlation coefficient between all variables under
consideration is less than 0.8 implying that the explanatory variables can separately contribute to
the variation in the dependent variable.
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Table 4.7 logit estimate for the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability
90.0 CI for Exp(B)
B S.E Wald Df Sign. Exp(B) Lower Upper
Step l" Ag .342 .616 .307 1 .579 1.407 .511 3.878
Educ -.661 .387 2.915 1 .088*** .517 .273 .976
Busty(l) 15.387 3 .002*
LaS .586 .328 3.187 1 .074*** 1.797 1.047 3.082
OTSC(I) -4.019 1.634 6.051 1 .014** .018 .001 .264
Kmbgif(s.ties) 6.696 2 .035**
Numgroup 12.612 2 .002*
Gen(1) 3.667 2 .160
sgmbtf(l) 6.620 2.737 5.851 1 .016** 750.221 8.317 6.767E4
rulecond( 1) 10.842 3.859 7.891 1 .005* 5.111E4 89.434 2.921E7
viseot(l) 40.944 2.502E4 .000 1 .999 6.048E17 .000
Crovgr(l) -8.165 4.707 3.008 1 .083*** .000 .000 .656
dis(l) -3.670 1.169 9.848 1 .002* .025 .004 .174
training(l ) -2.421 4.019E4 .000 1 1.000 .089 .000
Familysize 13.572 3 .004*
Constant 4.407 1.063E5 .000 1 .457 82.035
*, **, and ***, significant at significance level of 1%,5% and 10% respectively.
Chi-Square = 175.838, P-Value = 0.000, df= 89 Nagelkerke R Square = 0.774 Cox & Snell
R Square = a .579 and -2 Log likelihood =104.155°
Source: - the data computation of (2014)
Where:- Ag = Age, Educ =educational level, Busty=business type, Las =land size, OTSC=other
source of credit, kmbgif= knowing members before group is formed (social ties), Numgroup
=number of the group (group size), Gen =gender, sgmbtf =screening the group,
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rulecond=internal rule and conduct, viseot=visiting each other (peer pressure), Crovgr= credit
officer visit/pressure, dis= distance, training=training and Familysize= Family size.
Four variables were found to be positive and statistically insignificant and these include
age, gender of the group member, visiting each other and training. The insignificance of the
variable age of the group member is rather surprising this is because the group members that
borrowed the loan from OCSSCO are around the same area that is, as the study the majority of
the borrower are between 29 years -39 years.
Edueationallevel (Edue)
The variable educational level of the respondents is positive and significant at 10% level of
significance on the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability. This show that
the probability of the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability is 0.517 units
times than when the group member is educated than none educated (illiterates). This is because
of the educated group member can manage their expenses and their business activities than
illiterate group members. These playa great role on the effectiveness of group lending and its
impact on profitability of the group. In support to the finding Bassem (2008) showed that the
more educated Borrowers are supposed to have the necessary facilities to select the profitable
projects and to manage them appropriately thereafter. These faculties are hoped to reduce
borrowers' delinquency. That show the group lending is effective and it has impact on
profitability. But surprisingly okurut et.al, (2009) result shows that educational level is
insignificant variable that did not determine the loan repayment of the group, which is the most
influential variable for the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability.
Training (training)
The managers of the woredas branch told a group interested in lending from OCSSCO must
participate in some training in order to know OCSSCO and loan operation for 3 days to 6 days.
Training time was measured by amount of time (in days) that the OCSSCO dedicated to
training group members on issues like loan management, group membership, screen the group
member and basic record keeping. This variable had a positive and insignificant effect on the
probability of effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability. The perception of
this is that increasing the capability of groups in terms of selection of group members, how to
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undertaking into a business and bookkeeping increases a capacity by group members to manage
their finances properly and then promote the effectiveness of the group lending and its impact on
profitability. But because of the training is given for short period of time that is for 3 days to 6
days and for primary school educated group member those who do not have hint about
bookkeeping and loan management the training is insignificant variable in this study. In opposite
to the findings okurut et.al (2009) state that this variable had a positive and significant effect at
10% significance level on the probability of loan repayment which show the effectiveness of
group lending and its impact on profitability. That means if the group member pay their loan
timely the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability is high and vice versa if
not.
Group Size /Number of group (Numgroup)
The variable group size /number of group have positive and significant influence on the
effectiveness of the group lending and its impact on profitability at significance level of 1%. The
logistic regression showed that as the number of the group increased by one unit the
effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability did notchanged by any units. This
result implied that the maximum number of the group is higher than those which have less
number of group member for the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability.
The impact of many numbers of group size /number of group on the effectiveness group lending
and its impact on profitability are 0.002 times than those of less group size. The same result was
stated by okurut et.al (2009) the group size variable, which was measured by the number
of people that form a particular group was found to have a negative and significant effect (at
5% significance level) on loan repayment performance, in addition to this Bastelaer and
Leathers (2006) result implied that with bigger groups, monitoring and evaluation within
groups becomes increasingly costly and difficult. This describes that smaller groups hold
advantage in tie together information, collective action and diminish implementation challenges
which result into higher repayment rates. From this it is easy to say that the effectiveness of
group lending and its impact is highly influenced by the group size of the borrower.
Screening (sgmbtf)
G044681 .~. \
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Screening the group before the group is formed has a positive and significant influence on
effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability at 5 % level of significance. This
implied that the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability is higher when the
group member screening the group before formation than the group did not screen the group
member. This help the group member to identify the behavior of the group member, who is hard
worker & not and who worry about their credit. Because the group member who differentiated
through this struggle for their group effectiveness and its profitability. The logit model indicates
that as the screening of the group increased by one unit the effectiveness of the group lending
and its impact on profitability is also adding by 6.620 units. These show that the screening and
effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability are directly related to each other. It
shows that the dependent and independent variable have positive relationship. The influence of
screening the member of the group before the formation is 750.221 times higher than the groups
did not held on the screening of group members before the formation. In opposite to this study
Sharma and Zeller (1996) show that screening, monitoring and enforcement among relatives
does not take place or at least is less effective, since relatives may more easily collude against the
program and delay repayment. From their analysis, it can be concluded that when the group is
relatives there is no screening and the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on
profitability become ineffective.
Social ties (kmbgif)
The extent of social ties and the manner in which they are used support different views on the
impact of social tics in effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability.
Results on the effect of social ties on repayment are in line with Zeller (1998), and Karlan (2007)
since their result is the sign of the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability.
Information contained in socially tied groups and group members' sensitivity to their social
network both lessen the consequences of adverse selection and moral hazard problems which
improve repayment performance that increase the effectiveness of group lending and its impact
on profitability. Habteabe (2005) describe that social ties and connection among members playa
role in facilitating the screening process that is the influential in the effectiveness of group
lending and its impact on profitability. Besley and Coate (1995) argues that if social sanctions
are not sufficiently. strong ,group lending may encourage default by members who would have
46
repaid under lending. That means, if social sanction is strong, group lending can improve
repayment rates by encouraging borrowers to help each other. Also Zeller (1996) show that
socially unified groups pool risks by misusing the members' asset that their repayment
performance is improved even in communities with high-risk exposure. Plus (Postelnicu 2012)
state that the reason why the methodology of group lending with joint liability is popular among
MFIs is that it forces group borrowers to use their social ties in order to screen, monitor and
enforce loan repayment on their peers. Which shows the effectiveness of group lending and its
impact on profitability of the group based borrower of OCSSCO of Jimma zone. Knowing the
group member is having friend ship and social ties among the group member before the group is
formed. At this moment the group's member differentiates the group deeply in all cases. This
controlling variable has a positive and significant influence on the effectiveness of group lending
and its impact on profitability at 5 % of significance level. The effectiveness of group lending
and its impact on profitability is increased by 0.026 units when the group member know each
other before formation of the group than, the group is not knowing each other before the group
formation.
Other source of credit (OTSC)
The variable other source of credit has positive and significant influence on group lending and its
impact on profitability at 5 % level of significance .This show that as other source of credit
decrease the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability is increased. The logit
model indicates that as other source of credit to the group increases by one unit the effectiveness
of group lending and its impact on profitability decreases by 4.019 units. This is the same result
(positive) as hypothesized by the researcher. Other sources of credit influence the effectiveness
of group lending and its impact on profitability by 0.018 times than ifthere is no other source of
credit to group bared lending. In support to this finding, Paxton (1996) if someone has too many
other debt contracts, then they may pay back the informal loans to friends or to informal lending
groups before they repay to their formal group. This can determine the group lending is
ineffective and its impact on profitability or not.
Family size (Familysize)
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Family size is positive and statistically significant at 1% of significance level on the
effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability. From the logistic regression, it can
be concluded that the family size can influence the effectiveness of group lending and its impact
on profitability in undetermined direction. In opposite to this result Abreham (2002) resulted
household size found to be insignificant variable and got positive signs.
Internal rule and conduct (rulecond)
The internal rule and conduct variable has positive and significant impact on effectiveness of
group lending and its impact on profitability at 1% level of significance. This implies that the
effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability is high when the group has internal
rule and conduct than when the group did not have it. It indicates that as the internal rule and
conduct strengthened the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability is
increased by 10.842 units. Internal rule and conduct imposes the effectiveness of the group
lending and its impact on profitability by 5.111 times than those groups with no internal rule and
conducts. The same to this (Vigenina et.aI2004) state that the groups of lower risk have internal
rules that are stricter than the rules followed by the borrowers from higher risk groups.
Monitoring indicates the frequency of meetings between group members. Also, the study of
Bassem (2008) showed that the repayment is influenced positively by the internal rule of
conduct, which most importantly influenced the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on
profitability. Also Godquin (2004) described access to multiple loans not only tempts women
into engaging in high risk economic activities but also reduces their incentives to ensure
business success and loan repayment that show the unsuccessfulness of the group and that
impose negatively on the effect of group lending on profitability. Based on this evidences the
internal rule and conduct playa great role in the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on
profitability of the OCSSCO of Jimma zone.
Gender (Gen)
The Gender variable is statistically insignificant. That indicated the effectiveness of group
lending and its impact on profitability of OCSSCO borrower was never based on the gender is
males or females. In opposite to hypothesized, the gender of the borrower does not influence the
group lending and its impact on profitability. In support the finding (Godquin 2004) showed that
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Sex did not prove to have a significantly better repayment performance which is the indicator of
group lending effectiveness and its impact on profitability. Even though the coefficient is
positive, it is not significant. The results cannot justify the priority given to women in
microfinance programs based on better repayment performance of women as is sometime done
the official description of the effectiveness of the group and it has the direct effect on the
profitability of the group. In support to this okurut et.al (2009) state that gender of the group
leader is insignificance of the variable. Opposing to the finding and (Godquin, 2004) Paxton
(1996) state that the significant positive sign on the Gender variable indicated that the probability
of a loan repayment problem was higher for males than for females this indicate that the group
lending is more ineffective and less impact on profitability when the group lender is male than
females.
Peer pressure /visiting each other (vieot)
The group pressure have positive signs and insignificant explanatory power on the effectiveness
of group lending and its impact on profitability indicating the importance of this variable in
alleviating moral hazards, the main implication of it. This is because the group members visit
each other and discus on all things. When they meet each other regularly the adaptation of the
behavior of each 'other can increase and they neglect the idea of each other. Even though they
believe that their visiting each other help their group to be effective and has impact on
profitability peer pressure is insignificant to it. In despite to this the group member put pressure
on the group member when he/she does not pay his/her credit. The pressures are morale
persuasion, harassing, village talk and exclusion from social activities when he/she totally refuse
not to pay the credit. The group member feel very angry if their colleagues default because
he/she pay the credit defaulted by the group member. Opposing results were found by Wydick
(1999) and Karlan (2007). The results show that a greater degree of pressure among group
members reduces the number of days of late repayment the sign of the effectiveness of group
lending and its impact on profitability while the effectiveness group lending and its impact on
profitability is measured in case of repay ability in other way. The probability of the
effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability problems decreases since the more
the group members exchange visits between them, the more the opportunity to control their
behaviors will be raised to the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability.
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Land size (Las)
Land size is the amount of land owned by each group members. In this study the land owned by
group members was 0.5 hectare as a minimum and 8 hectares as a maximum. The logistic model
show that land size variable has positive and significant on the effectiveness of group lending
and its impact on profitability at 10% of significance level. This implied that as the land size of
the group member increase by one unit the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on
profitability increase by 0.586 units. The High land size owned by group borrower has impact on
effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability than when the group borrower has
less land size by 1.816 units. In opposite to this Al-azzamet.al (2012) result shows that the
variable land has negative sign but statistically insignificant. The same to this result obtained by
Zeller (1998) state that Land ownership as a measure of wealth seems to be unimportant factor in
determining repayment behavior. Since it shows that the effectiveness of group lending and its
impact on profitability, it can be recognized from their result the land size owned by the group
member did not influence it.
Business type (Busty)
The business type variable was positive and significant at the 5% level of significance. This
implied that the borrowers involved in agriculture, such as coffee plantation and animal fattening
have impact on effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability of the group.
Mokhtar et.al (2010) stated that a borrower whose business was in agriculture will have a loan
repayment problem. This is opposite to the findings in the study that loan repayment problem is
the sign of ineffectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability. Also Bassem (2008)
in his finding he puts the fact one cannot decide on an exact sign of the business type.
Credit officer visit/staff pressure (crovgr)
Credit officer visit is the visit that the credit officer /staff held to look the business activities of
the group borrowed the money from the institution (OCSSCO). The credit officer visit the lend
group per a month during going to collect the credit from the group member. In addition to this
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the credit officer taught them how to save, how to manage their loan and how to repay their
credit. The model showed that the variable credit officer visit had a positive and significant
influence on the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability at significance
level of 10%. The effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability is negatively
related to the credit officer visit/staff pressure. This is as the credit officer highly visits the group
member time from time the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability is
decreased by 8.165 units. This is because the group members only think about their loan
repayment only, not about the profitability of the group and they worried daily he/she would
come today or tomorrow and the like. The effectiveness of group lending and its impact on
profitability did not changed when the credit officer visit/staff pressure is high or were not high.
Distance (dis)
Distance is a community-level variable computed as the mean distance from the village to micro
finance institution service. The variable distance measure how the group members far from each
other in their kebele. The main distance between the group members is 0.5 km at the minimum to
6 krn at maximum in average at the rural area and 0.02 krn at minimum and 1.5 km at maximum
in average at urban area. The distance is taken approximately as the respondents' replied in this
study. This variable had a positive and significant influence on the effectiveness of group lending
and its impact on profitability at significance level of 1%. Distance negatively related with
effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability. This shows that as the distance
between the group member's increase by one unit the effectiveness of the group lending and its
impact on profitability decrease by 3.67 units. The effectiveness of group lending and its impact
on profitability is higher when the distance between the members is less than when it is long by
0.02 units. Sharma et.al (1997) in case of the distance observed that repayment rates of group-
based systems are especially good in relatively remote communities. This is directly related
to the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability that means the group lending
is effective and increases the profitability of the group. Because when the group is nearest to
each other they put pressure to work their business in well manner. In opposite to this the
findings of Wydick (1999) suggest that the distance between borrowers' businesses is also
negatively correlated to repayment performance in rural areas. This shows that the group is
ineffective and has negative impact on profitability of the group.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 CONCLUSIONS
The 4th chapter of the study contains the data analysis and the findings of the study. In this
chapter the major findings of the study are concluded and recommended based on the findings
and are forwarded for the concerned bodies.
The nature of this research is descriptive type and econometric model analysis that incorporates
fact finding inquiries and surveys with regard to the effectiveness of group lending and its impact
on profitability in Jimma Zone OCSSCO. The main objective of this research is to assess and
analyze the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability at Jim~a--zone
OCSSCO. This may give some possible insights to micro finance institution related policy
makers to give closer attention towards tackling the problems raised in association with the
effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability by providing appropriate
suggestions. The collected data from each selected group of the OCSSCO microfinance borrower
officers found in Jimma Zone were filtered, categorized and proceeded using descriptive
statistics econometric model by employing SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Scientists)
version -16 windows software.
Descriptive analysis results revealed that the loan did not misused was about 139(68.5%). It
indicates that the group based borrower did misused the loan borrowed is approximately
64(31.5%). Although it was that the misused loan affects the business of the group members
business strongly badly that is 32.8 % (21). This means that the group based borrower used the
borrowed money to other purpose such as personal consumption, buy the students uniform and
pay some other credit they got from their friends and other source of credits. When the group
member's business affected by the misuse of the loan they borrowed, the effectiveness of group
lending and its impact on profitability decreased immediately. The group member who misused
loan pay their credit by themselves and sometimes the whole group member pay the credit when
member totally enable to pay his/her credit. And also most of the group based have profit after
they are formed (joining) the group and borrowed money from OCSSCO of Jimma zone, with
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the count of 94.1% (191) of the respondents of the survey held at OCSSCO of Jimma zone. This
indicates that almost all of the group based lenders are profitable from the money they borrowed
from OCSSCO. From this angle, those groups (that is those who are benefited) from the group
formed and lending have the slogan of "WLQO KOO QORICHA RAKKOO KOO!" which to
mean that "MY OCSSCO TO MY PROBLEM" because those group are leave out from their
problem with the help of the credit they got from OCSSCO. The group members that have had
profit send their child to school, changed their house furniture, changed their house from
thatched to iron sheet and go healthy center more than usual they are going with the account of
50.25%, 49.26%, 48.77% and 53.69% respectively. This shows that the group lending is
effective and has impact on profitability.
Most of the group members' those who got loan from OCSSCO are the married and lived in the
same area for long period of time presents 73.9% and 35.5% of the total of the respondents of
the study. These show that there is effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability
because the married people worried about their family life style and they know about each other
in all cases. Majority of the group is formed with the initiation of the group member themselves
that counts 60.6% this show that since the group is formed with the initiation of themselves the
effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability is high. The groups that are formed
did not have the experience of participating in group activities. From this it can be recognized
that the non-experienced group did not know how to manage their group members and pay their
credit properly which bring the ineffectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability.
And the majority of the group member never applied for loan because the respondents never
consider that they can get loan from other that is banks and other institution because they think
that they cannot get loan from them for the reason of the group borrowers do have a loan of
OCSSCO of Jimma zone. Some of the group members are refused because of they do not have
enough collateral, do not know as they can get from banks & other lending institutions and there
is no consignor. From this point of view the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on
profitability was increased because the group member was only credible to the OCSSCO's
credit.
With regard to credit default as an effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability
measure for the study, Educational level, Business type, Land size, Other source of credit, Social
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ties, Number of group/group size, Rule and conduct, Credit officer visit/pressure, Distance and
family size has a positive and significant impact on the effectiveness of group lending and its
impact on profitability. Against the hypothesis one the regression analysis result indicated that
the female is effective and has impact on profitability. This means that the groups which are
females are more effective in group lending and its impact on profitability than more males'
group members. Also the family size had a sign against the hypothesized at the regression
analysis result. This means that as the family size increase the effectiveness of group lending and
its impact on profitability can increased. This show that as the group members strives for the
survival of his/her family life he/she also contribute for the effectiveness of group lending and its
impact on profitability. In opposite to the above explanatory variables the variables such as Age,
Gender, Visiting each other/peer pressure and training have positive sign and insignificant
influence on the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability.
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
);> The OCSSCO should give attention to the group member that are formed from educated
people because the group can understand the training given them to manage their credit,
pay their credit and can save the money they got that determine the effectiveness of
group lending and its impact on profitability.
);> OCSSCO should embark into greater coordination amongst themselves to restrain the
problem of other source of credit among clients which enhances loan default. The
policy option is for OCSSCO to collaborate in the creation of a credit reference for all
their clients.
);> The OCSSCO need to undertake periodic reviews of the factors that cause clients to
misuse of their credit with a view to addressing those that are attributed to
OCSSCO's effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability for OCSSCO
group based borrower.
);> The OCSSCO of Jimma zone should follow the borrower those who misused the loan
they borrowed from it in the way of giving training how the group member manage their
credit and how implement their business with respect to the amount of the money they
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borrow. And the credit officer of OCSSCO should pave the way how to save and
encourage saving money from what they get and disburse properly the loan to group
members also the credit officer should tell group members as they misused their business
is badly affected.
~ The group members recruited into the credit program should have adequate business
experience in their kebeles or villages in some group based activities such as kebele
administration, idir ekub and the like to run viable business.
~ The members of group formation into the credit program should be formed without the
initiation of credit officer. This does not mean that the credit officer totally held in the
initiation of the group formation, even if the credit officer take part in the initiation in
few, the credit officer should save themselves from initiation to form the group.
~ The OCSSCO should give loan to group member that are located at the nearest to each
other those who can visit each other to discuss about their business in detail daily.
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Appendix 1
Jimma University
College Of Business and Economics
School Of Graduate Studies
MSC Program in Accounting and Finance
Questionnaires
Dear respondents:
You are being asked to participate in a survey that intends to assess the effectiveness of group
lending and its impact on profitability in OCSSCO at jimma zone. This study is conducted in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for master's Degree in Accounting and Finance by Ato
Endalew Gutu. This is survey questionnaire which is aimed at identifying and collecting data
about the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability in OCSSCO Jimma Zone.
Your response to these questions has a paramount importance to complete the study, confidential
and won't be used in any form for another purpose.
I respectfully request your kind cooperation in answering the questions that follow a clearly and
frankly as possible and your response will be highly confidential.
Thank you in advance for your kind cooperation
If you have any question, you any contact the researcher by the following addresses:
Mobile: - 09-13-759922 or
Email address:-endgut70@yahoo.com
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Select one of the answers from the given choice or write it as required.
Demographic status of the respondents
1) Sex A) Male B) Female
2) Age: A) 18-29 years B) 30-40 years C) 41-50 years D) above 51
3) Marital status
A) Single B) Married C) Divorced D) Widowed
4) What is the level of your education? grade.
Types of business
5) What is your principal type of business?
A) Agriculture B) Services C) Trading D) Manufacturing
6) If your answer is "A" or agriculture how much is your land?
in hectares.-----------------------------------
7) Based on question number six does it affect your paying ability to the borrowed money from
the institution?
A) Yes B) No
8) As your answer of question number "7" please give the reason.
Other sources
9) Do you have other sources of credit?
A) Yes B) No
10) If the answer to question "9" is "yes" Which of the following are your sources?
A) Local traders/suppliers B) local Moneylenders C) Banks D) Relatives/friends
E) Other _
11) Has any bank or some other lending institution ever refused you a loan?
A) Yes B) No C) Never applied
12) If your answer to question No 11 is "No", please give the reason among the given.
A) Lack of collateral B) No consignor C) Do not know D) Other reasons
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Solidarity
13) Have you had problems repaying your debt in the current loan cycle?
A) Yes B) No C) I do not remember
14) If your answer to question 13 is yes, please what is the reason?
A) Natural disaster B) Profit loss C) Illness of family member D) Death of family member
E) Competition was tough
15) If your answer to question 13 is no, please list the reason
16) How many times did this happen if your answer is "yes" for question 13?
times.---------------------------
17) Do you have help from your group members to pay your credit?
I
A) Yes B) No
18) If your answer to question 17 is "yes" how many of them helped you?
of them.------------------------------
19) If your answer to question 17 is "No" what is the reason?
Value the future loan access
20) How do you value future (subsequent) access of a loan from the lending program?
A) Very high B) High C) Moderate D) Little E) Not at all
21) If your answer to question 20 is "Little or Not at all" please what is the reason?
22) How many times has your group received a loan from the program? times
Social ties
23) How long have you lived in this village/town? For years.
24) Have you ever participated in another group? A) Yes B) No
25) If your answer to question No 24 is "yes" why you leave that group?
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26) How well did you know the members before you formed this group?
A) Good B) Hardly C) not at all
27) If you did not know your fellow group member did not know him/her at all, why did you
accept him/her as a member in the group?
A) He/she is a friend of another member B) His/her business looks good C) He/she is a relative
of another member
28) Who initiated the group formation?
A) Members themselves B) Group leaders C) Credit officer
Homogeneity
29) How many members does your group have? _
30) Does the size of your group affect the effectiveness ofthe group?
A) Yes B) No
31) Based on your answer for question number 30 in what manner it affects?
32) What is the gender of the group members?
A) Female B) Male C) It includes both sexes
33) Based on your answer for question No 32 when your group is good to pay its credit?
A) When the member is only female B) When the member is only male C) When it has both sex
34) What is the reason for your answer to question No 33?
35) Did you know about the behavioral integrity of all potential group members before the
formation of your group?
A) Yes B) No
36) Do you screen the group member before forming the group?
A) Yes B) No
37) If your answer to question No 36 is yes, whom do you ask for more information?
A) Neighbors B) Friends C) Relatives D) Money lenders
38) If your answer to question 36 is yes, what information do you seek from the above
individuals?
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A) About what docs he/she do for a living? B) About how his/her business (farm) doing?
C) About his/her creditworthy D) About he/she is a hard worker
39) Do you have internal group agreements and rules of conduct?
A) Yes B) No
40) If your answer to question No 39 is "Yes" what kind of rules? A) Written B) Verbal
41) How do you agree that the existence of the agreement or rule help your group to be
effective?
A) Strongly agree B) Agree C) Disagree D) Strongly Dis agree
Peer pressure
42) Do you visit each other at the business or at home regularly?
A) Yes B) No
43) If your answer to question No 42 is "yes" how often do you visit each other?
A) Daily B) Once a week C) per two week D) per a month
44) Does your visiting each other help your group to be success?
A) Yes B) No C) I don't know
45) Do you put a pressure on a group member who does not pay his/her credit? A) Yes B) No
46) If your answer to question No 45 is "yes" What form of pressure does your group use
against defaulting member to repay his/her dues?
A) Moral persuasion B) Village talk C) Harassing D) Exclusion from social activities
47) How do you feel if a group member defaults?
A) Very angry B) Neutral C) Kindly
48) If your answer to question No 47 is "very angry" why you angry? Please give your reason.
49) Do you penalize a member defaulting? A) Yes B) No
50) If you say "yes" to No 49 What form of penalty would the group impose against a defaulting
member?
A) He/she will be denied following loans B) He/she will have to leave the group
C) He/she will be reported to the village leaders or administrators
D) He/she will be reported to the credit officer E) He/she will lose his/her assets
Loan officer visit or pressure
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51) Does a credit officer visit your group? A) Yes B) No C) I have not seen
52) If your answer is "Yes" to question No 51 how often does the credit officer visit you?
A) Once a week B) per a two week C) per a month D) Once per every three months
53) If your answer is "Yes" to question No 51 how do you agree it help your group to be
effective or success?
A) I highly agree B) I agree C) I disagree D) I highly disagree
Loan diversification
54) Has anyone member of your group misused loans? A) Yes B) No
55) If your answer to question No 54 is "yes" how it affect your group business?
A) Badly B) somewhat bad C) Strongly Bad D) Not at all
56) If your answer to question No 54 is "yes" who repay the loan?
A) The member him/herself B) The group leader C) The hole group member
57) Why do you repay your loans?
A) Because you want to stay on good terms with the group
B) Because you want to fulfill your moral obligation towards the group
C) Because you highly value future access to loans from the program
D) Because you want to settle your debt
Loan size
58) How many birr do you get from the institution at the beginning of your loan? birr.
59) How do you agree as the loan increase the group member is continuing together in their
group?
A) Strongly agree B) Agree C) Dis agree D) strongly disagree
60) If your answer is strongly disagree please what is the reason?
Relationship
61) Does your group is composed of different families?
A) Yes B) No C) I don't know the composition
62) If your answerto question 61 is no from which of the following is your composition?
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A) Only from the same family B) From neighbor but different family C) From both family and
neighbor
63) Give the composition of the group which IS used the group to be
effective.--------------------------------------------------------
Training
64) Do you get training during you are made group to borrow from the institution?
A) Yes B) No C) I do not remember it
65) If your answer to No 64 is "yes" for how many days? Days.
66) How much is the distance between your groups member? km averagely.
67) Does the distance between your group members affect your group? A) Yes B) No
68) If your answer to question No 67 is yes how it affect the group?
69) Number of oxen owned by the group member (in number).
70) Based question on number 69 how it affects the groups' effectiveness?
A) Very highly B) Highly C) Low D) Very low
71) What is the group members' Family size? (in number).
72) How the family size affects the groups paying ability that has the effects on group's
effectiveness? A) Very highly B) Highly C) Low D) Very low
73) Do you get any benefit after you joined the group? A) Yes B) No
74) Please put your degree of agree in front of the following services
Changes in Highly agree Agree Dis agree Highly disagree
Increase sending children to school
Increase going healthy service
Changing the house roof from grass
to steel
Changing the house furniture
75) Please give the ideas that used to continue group lending effectiveness or improve its
effectiveness.
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Appendix 2
Universitii Jimmaa
Kolleejji Barnoota Sadarkaa Digirii lamaffaa
Garee Bizinasii fi Ikonomiksii
Sagantaa Digirii Lamaffa akkawuntingii fi Fayinansii
Gaffilee
Kabajamoo Deebii deebisaa:
Isin mataa duree qorannoo "Assessing the effectiveness of Group lending and its impact on
profitability" ykn Bu'a qabeessumma gareen liqeeffachuu fi dhiibbaa inni bu'aa irratti qabu.
Qorannoon kun kan rawwatu Obbo Indaaloo Guutuu dhaan , sabaaba Digirii lamaffaa gosa
barnoota "Accounting and Finance" tiin Xumursisu danda'udhaaf. Kaayyoon Gaaffiilee
Qorannoo kanaa waa'ee Bu'a qabeessumma gareen liqeeffachuu fi dhiibbaa inni bu'aa irratti
qabu Waajjira liqii fi qusannaa oromiyaa dame godina jimmaa adda basuu fi Dataa funaanu dha.
Deebiin keessan qorannoo kana xumursisuudhaaf faayidaa gudda qaba,Icciittiin isa eegama fi
faayida biroofhin olu.
Kanaaf,gaaffii kana hordofuun haala garii fi karaa danda'ammuun waan naaf ibsitaniif galaata
guddaa qabdu.
Waan na gargaartaniif dursa galatoomaa.
Y00 gaaffii qabdu tataan teessoo armaan gadiin na argachuu dandeessu.
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Lakk.biI.09-13-759922 ykn
Email: endgut70@gmail.com
Gaaffiilee aarmaan gadiif deebii sirrii ta'a jettee kan itti amantu filadhu.
Haala dhuunfaa
1) Saala A) Dhiira B) Dhalaa
2) Umurii waggaa A) Waggaa 19-29 B) Waggaa 30-40 C) waggaa 41-50 D) Waggaa 51 01
3) Haala jireenya kcessanii
A) Kan qofaajiraatu B) Kan fuudheeru C) Kan hiikeeru D) Qeerroo
4)Sadarkaa barnootaa keessanii. Kutaa _
Gosa hojii keessanii
5) Gosti hojii kecssanii inni guddaan maali?
A) Qonnaa B) Tajaajila C)Daldala D) Oomisha
6) Yoo deebiin keessaan "A"ykn qonnaa ta'e bal'inni lafa keessanii hammami?
hektaaraan.-------------------
7) Gaaffii 6ffaa irratti hundaa'aatii dandeettii kaffaltii keessanirrattii (qarshii WLQO irraa
Iiqeeffattanirrattii) dhiibbaa qabaa? A) Eeyyee B) Lakki
8) Haala deebii kee gaaffii "7" irratti hundaa'iitii, maaloo sababa isaa ibsi.
69
Madda Iiqii biraa
9) Madda liqii biraa qabduu? A) Eeyyee B)Lakki
10) Yoo deebiin kee gaaffii 9fTaa "eeyyee" ta'e kanneen aarmaan gadii keessaa isa kam irraatii?
A) Daldaltoota irraa B) Namoota naannoo liqii liqeessan irraa C) Baankii D) Fira/hiriyyaa
E) Kanbiroo _
11) Manni baankii ykn dhaabbanni biroon sinii liqeessuu didaniiruu?
A) Eeyyee B) Lakki C) Hin iyyanne/hin gaafanne
12) Yoo deebiin kce gaaffii 11 fTaa "lakki" ta'e, sababa isaa naaf ibsaamee?
A) Waanan qabsiisu dhabeen B) Hin beeku C) Sababiibiroo
Tokkummaa
13)Liqii liqeeffattan kanfaluuf rakkinni sin quuname jiraa?
A) Eeyyee B) Lakki C) Hin yaadadhu
14) Yoo deebiin kee gaaffii 13fTaa Eeyyee ta'e kanneen aarmaan gadii keessaa sababii isaa
filadhu. A) Balaa uumamaa B) Bu'aa dhabuu C) Dhukkubsachuu maatii D) Du'aatii maatii
E) Dorgommiin cimaa ta'uu isaa
15) Yoo deebiin kee lakkofsa 13 lakkii ta'e sababni isaa maal ta'aa?
16) Yoo deebiin kee 13fTaafeeyyee ta'e si'a meeqaafsi quunname? Si'a f.
17)Liqii liqeeffattan kaffaluuf gargaarsa miseensa garee kee irraa argatteettaa?
A) Eeyyee B) Lakki
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18) Y00 deebiin kee gaaffii 17 eeyyee ta' e meeqqan isaaniitu si gargaare? _
isaanii.
19) Yoo gaaffii 17tTaa lakkijette ta'e sababan isaa maal ta'ajettee yaaddaa?
Liqii gara fulduraaf bakka kennuu
20) Liqii gara fulduraaf hamma hammam yaaddaa?
A) Baay'een yaada B) Nan yaada C) Giddugaleessaan yaada D) Xiqqoo xiqqoon yaada E)
homaallee hin yaadu
21) Y00 deebiin kee lakkoofsa 20 xiqqoo xiqqoo ykn homaa hin yaaduu ta' e ,maaloo sababa isaa
naaftarreessi.-------------------------------
22 Al-meeqaaf(si'a meeqaaf) WLQO irraa gareen liqeeffattan? Si'a f
Walitti hidhaminsa Hawwaasummaa
23) Harnmamiif ganda kana ykn magaalaa kana jiraattee? f
24) Garee kanaan alatti garee biroo keessa turteettaa? A) Eeyyee B) Lakki
25) Y00 gaaffii 24ffaa eyyee jette maaliif garee sana keessaa baate(gadhiiftee)?
26)Osoo garee kana hin ijaariin miseensa gareekee hammam isaan beektaa?
A)Sirriittiin isaan beeka B) nan beeka C) Gonkumaa isaan hin beeku
27) Y00 miseensa garee kee hin beektu ta' e, maaliif ofittii isaan dabalte?
A) Hiriyyaa misecnsa gara biraa waanta'eeflteef B) Qabeenyaan isaa gaarii waan ta'ef C) Fira
misecnsa gara biraa waan ta'eef
28) Eenyutu gareen kun akka uumamuufkakaase?
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A) Miseensa garee ofuma isaanii B) Hoogganaa garichaa C) Hojjetaa liqii dhaabbatichaa
Homogeneity
29) Gareen keessan miseensa meeqa qabaa? _
30)Baay'inni miseensa garee keessanii bu'a qabeessummaa garee keessaniirratti dhiibbaa qabaa?
A) Eeyyee B)Lakki
31)Deebiikee gaaffii 30ffaa irrattii hundaa'uudhaan haala kamiin miidhaa?
32) Saalaan misecnsa garee kee maalii?
A) Dhalaa B) Dhiira C) Saala lammaan isaa
33) Gareen tokkoo liqii isaa kaffaluufyoo maal ta'e gaarii ta'ajettee yaaddaa?
A) Yeroo miseensi dhalaa qofaa ta'u B) Yeroo miseensi dhiira qofaa ta'u C) Yeroo saala
lamaanuu qabaatu
34) Sababiin deebii kee lakkoofsa 33 maal ta'aa?
35) Osoo garee hin ijaariin dura waa'ee amala miseensa garee kee ni beektaa?
A) Eeyyee B) Lakki
36) Osoo garee hin ijaareen dura miseensa garee keessanii filattaniittuu? A) Eeyyee B) Lakki
37) Yoo deebiin kee lakkoofsa 36 eeyyee ta'e odeeffanoo waa'ee miseensichaa eenyuun
gaafattaa?
A) Ollaa isaa/ishee B) Hiriyyaa isaa/ishee C) Fira isaa/ishee D) Jara qarshii liqeessan
38) Yoo deebiin kee lakkoofsa 36 eeyyee ta'e odeeffanoo waa'ee nama dhuunfaa sanaa kan
akkamii gaafattuu?
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A) Jireenya isaaflisheef maal akka hojjetu/ttu B) Akkamiti hojii qonna isaa/ishee akka hojjetu/ttu
C) Waa'ee liqii isa irrajiru kaffaluu isaa/ishee D) Waa'ee cimee hojjechuu isaa/ishee
39) Walii gaItee keessaa fi danbii ittiin bulmaataa qabduu? A) Eeyyee B) Lakki
40)Yoo deebiin kee gaaffii lakkoofsa 39 eeyyee ta'ebifa kamiin qabduu?
A) Barreeffamaan B) Jechaan
41) Waliigalteen ylen seerrii j iraachuun isaa gareen keessaan bu' aa qabeessa ta'uu isaaf gargaare
jettee hangam walii galtaa?
A) Sirriitti waliingala B) Waliin gala C)Walii hin galu D)Sirriitti walii hin galu
Dhiibhaa garee
42) Bakka hojiitti ykn mana keessanitti wal hubattuu? A) Eeyyee B)Laklei
43)Yoo deebiin keessan gaaffii 42 eeyyee ta'e hammam wal hubattu?
A)Guyyaa guyyaan B)toorbeetti al tokko C) toorbee lamatti altokko D)Ji'aan al tokko
44) Wal hubachuun keessan gareen keessan fiixa akka bahuuf gargaareeraa?
A) Eeyyee B) Lakki C)Hin beeku
45) Miseensa garee kee idea isaa/ishee hin kaffalanne akka kaffalatuuf/ttuuf dhiibbaa irraan
geessee beektaa ? A) Eeyyee B) Lakki
46) Yoo deebiin kee gaafffii lakkoofsa 45f eeyyee yoo ta'e dhiibbaa gosa akkamii miseensa
garee keessanii lean idaa hin kaffalanne irraan geessistuu?
A) Dhiibbaa haamilee B) Namoota naannoo himuu C) Miidhaa gama saa!aan irraan gahuun
D) Sochii haawaasaamrnaa irraa qooduu
47) Yoo miseensi garee kee liqii liqeeffatan kaffaluufmaaltu siitti dhagahama?
A) Baay'een aara B) homtuu natti hin dhaga'amu C) hiriyyumaan/gargaarsaan
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48) yoo deebiin kee lakkoofsa 47 baay'een aara ta'e maaliif akka ta'ee sababa isaa ibsimee?
49) Miseensa garee kee kan liqii isaa/ishee hin kaffallee adabduu? A) Eeyyee B) Lakki
50)Yoo gaaffii lakkoofsa 49tTaa eeyyee jette gareen kee adabbii akkamii irratti fudhattuu?
A) Liqii irraa duubatti hambisuun B) Garee keessaa baasuu C) Bulchinsa gandaatti himachuu
D) Hojjetaa WALQO tti gabaasuu E) Qabeenyaa isaanii irraa fudhuu
Hubannaa/dhiibbaa qondaala Iiqii
51) Qondaalaan liqii garee keessan hubatee/ilaalee beekaa?
A) Eeyyee B) Lakki C) Argee hin beeku
52) Yoo gaaffii 51 eeyyee jette qondaalli liqii hammamittii sin hubataa?
A) Toorbeetti al tokko B) Toorbee lamatti al tokko C) ji'atti al tokko D) Ji'a sadiitti al tokko
53)Yoo gaaffii lakkoofsa 51 eeyyee jette fixa bahinsa garee keessaniif gahee qabaachuu isaa
hagam itti amantaa?
A) Sirriitti ittan amana B)Ittan amana C) itti hin amanu D)Sirriitti itti hin amanu
Liqii waan biroof oolchuu
54) Miseensi garec keessanii liqii liqeeffate waan liqeeffateef ala fayyadameeraa?
A) Eeyyee Bjl.akki
55) Yoo deebiin kee gaaffii 54feeyyee ta'e hojii keessan hammam miidhaa?
A) Garmalee B) homaa hinjedhu C) Baay'ee garmalee D) walumaa galattii homaayyuu
56) Yoo gaaffii 54ffaa eeyyee jettee deebiste eenyutu liqii sana kanfalaa?
A) Miseensichuma ofumsaa/shee B)Itti gaafatamaa garee C) Miseensa garee hunduma isaanii
57) Liqii keessan maaliif kaffaltuu?
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A)Miseensa garee waliin haala gaariin turuu waan barbaadduuf
B)Dirqamakee bahuu waan barbaadduufC) Liqii gara fulduraatiifiddoo guddaa waan keennituuf
D) Liqii irraa bilisa ta'uu waan barbaadduuf
Hamma Iiqii
58) Dhaabbata kanarraa yeroo jalqabaaf qarshii meeqa liqeeffattanii?
qarshii --------------------------------
59) Akkaa liqiin dnbalaa adeemu gareen waliin turun isaan cimaa adeema.
A)Sirriitti ittan amana B) ittan amana C) Itti hin amanu D)Sirriitti itti hin amanu
60) Yoo deebiin kee gaaffii 59 sirriittii itti hin amanu kanjedhu ta'e sababiin isaa maal ta'aa?
Firooma
61)Gareen keessan matii adda addaa irraa ijaaramee? A) Eeyyee B) Lakki C) Hin beeku
62) Gaaffii 61 ffaa irraatti hundaa'uun fixa bahinsa garee tokkoof gareen sun akkamiin ijaaramuu
qabaa? _
Leenjii
63) Yeroo liqii argachuuf garee ijaarttan leenjii argattaniittuu?
A) Eeyyee B) Lakki C) Hin yaadadhu.
64) Based on your answer for question number 63 what is the reason? Please list it
65) Yoo deebiin gaaffii 63
guyyaa L
eeyyee ta'e guyyaa meeqaaf liinj itanii?
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66) Fageenyi miseensa garee keessan gidduu jiru hammam ta'aa?giddugaleessaan
km ta'a.
67) Fageenyi miscensa garee keessan gidduu garee keessan irratti dhiibbaa fideeraa?
A) Eeyyee B) Lakki
68) Yoo deebiin kee gaaffii 67ffaa eeyyee ta'e akkamittin garee keessan miidhuu danda'aa?
69) Baay'ina sangootaa miseensa gareen qabuu Lakk.
70) Gaaf:fii69 irratti hundaa'uun hammam garee keessan jijjiiruu danda'aa?
A) Garmalee jijjiira B) ni jijjiira C) hin jijjiiru D) garmalee hin jijjiiru.
71) Baay'ina matii miseensi garichaa qabu Lakk.
72)Baay'inni miseensaa maatii garichaa dandeettii kaffaluu keessanii kan fixa ba'umsa garee
keessanii agarsiisu irratti hammam dhiibbaa fidaa?
A) Garmalee dhiibbaa fida B) dhiibbaa fida C) dhiibbaa hin fidu D) garmalee dhiibbaa hin fidu
73) Erga garee kanatti dabalamtee bu'aa argatteettaa? A) Eeyyee B) Lakkii
74) Hamma walii galtee kee jijjiirama / bu'aa argame irratti qabdu tajaajiloota armaan gadii
irratti mul'isii.
Jijjiirama Sirriitti Waliin gala Walii hin galu Sirriitti walii
waliin galaa hin galu
Daa'imman gara mana barnootaatti
erguun dabaleera
TajaajiJa fayyaa argachuuf mana
yaalaa deemuun dabaleera
Manajireenyaa mana citaa irraa gara
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qorqorroottii jijjiirranneerra
Meeshaalee mana keessaa
jijjiirraneerra.
75) Haala bu'aa qabeessummaan gareen liqeeffachuu itti fufuu fi fooya'uu danda'urratti yaada
qabdan ibsaa
Galatoomaa !
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Appendix 3
Interview for OCSSCO Woreda branch Managers
Jimma University
College Of Graduate Studies
School of Business and Economics
MSc Program in Accounting and Finance
Introduction: Good morning/ afternoon. My name is Endalew Gutu: I am MSc Degree student in
Accounting and finance at Jimma University. I am working this Thesis for the partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of masters in Accounting and finance. I am currently
conducting studies on group lending area: a baseline study to assess the effectiveness of group
lending and its impact on profitability in Jimma Zone. You have been selected to participate in
this study because of your position in woreda OCSSCO Branch. The findings of this study will
be for further research on this area in Oromia. All the information you give will be kept
confidentially. First of all I want to thank you for your voluntary to make this interview.
Date:
Name of interviewee: ----------------------
Position and name of the office: ----------------------------
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The interview which is related to the assess of the effectiveness of group lending and its impact
on profitability in Jimma Zone
1) Do you think that the group lending is effective and has impact in profitability efficiently?
How?
2) Do you believe that the group lending is important for change the leaving standard of the
borrower ?In what manner?
3) Does the OCSSCO branch give training, for the group members to make them effective and
have impacts on their profitability? For how longperiod of time?
4) Is the group that borrowed more birr is effective than those who borrowed less (few) birr?
How?
5) Does the loan period, have effect on group lending effectiveness and profitability?
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Appendix 4
HOSMER AND LEMESHOW TEST
Classification Tablea,b,c
Predicted
know the credit default of the
group
Percentage
Observed Yes No Correct
Step 0
know the credit default Yes 0 93 .0
of the group
No 0 110 100.0
Overall Percentage 54.2
a. No terms in the model.
b. Initial Log-likelihood Function: -2 Log Likelihood = 281.418
c. The cut value is .500
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square Df Sig.
Step 1 Step 50.470 24 .001
Block 50.470 24 .001
Model 50.470 24 .001
Model Summary
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-2 Log Cox & Snell Nagelkerke R
Step likelihood R Square Square
1 230.947a .220 .294
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5
because parameter estimates changed by less than
.001.
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square Df Sig.
1 4.387 8 .821
Classification Tablea
Predicted
know the credit default of Percentage
the group Correct
Observed
Step 1 Yes No
know the credit default Yes 58 35 62.4
ofthe group
No 25 85 77.3
Overall Percentage 70.4
a. The cut value is .500
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Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
know the credit default of know the credit default of
the group = yes the group = no
Observed Expected Observed Expected Total
Step 1 1 17 16.795 3 3.205 20
2 15 15.355 5 4.645 20
3 14 13.346 6 6.654 20
4 11 11.116 9 8.884 20
5 10 9.420 10 10.580 20
6 10 8.064 10 11.936 20
7 5 6.718 15 13.282 20
8 5 5.678 15 14.322 20
9 2 4.l33 18 15.867 20
10 4 2.381 19 20.619 23
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Table 4.7 logit estimate for the effectiveness of group lending and its impact on profitability
90.0 CI for Exp(B)
B S.E Wald Df Sign. Exp(B) Lower Upper
Step 1a Ag .342 .616 .307 1 .579 1.407 .511 3.878
Educ -.661 .387 2.915 1 .088*** .517 .273 .976
Busty 15.387 3 .002*
LaS .586 .328 3.187 1 .074*** 1.797 1.047 3.082
OTSC(I) -4.019 1.634 6.051 1 .014** .018 .001 .264
Kmbgif(s.ties) 6.696 2 .035**
-"L 1? fll? ? 00)*
Gen 3.667 2 .160
sgmbtf(l) 6.620 2.737 5.851 1 .016** 750.221 8.317 6.767E4
rulecond(1 ) 10.842 3.859 7.891 1 .005* 5.111E4 89.434 2.921E7
viseot(1) 40.944 2.502E4 .000 1 .999 6.048El .000
'7
Crovgr(1) -8.165 4.707 3.008 1 .083*** .000 .000 .656
efdis(l) -3.670 1.169 9.848 1 .002* .025 .004 .174
training( 1) -2.421 4.019E4 .000 1 1.000 .089 .000
Familysize 13.572 3 .004*
Constant 4.407 1.063E5 .000 1 .457 82.035
Chi-Square = 175.838, P-Value = 0.000,
degrees of freedom = 89 Nagelkerke R Square = 0 .774
Cox & Snell R Square = o .579 and -2 Log likelihood =104.155a
*, **, and ***, significant at significance level of 1%,5% and 10% respectively.
83
Correlation Test table--- - -----_.. -- - -
Cons ag edu Bust 015 Vfloa num gen sgm rule vise crov trai distanc Familysi
t. c y Las C n bergr btf con ot gr ning e ze
oup d
constant 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .00 .000 .000 -1.0 .000 .000
ag .000 1 -.13 -.16 .021 .238 -.003 .113 -.03 -.15 -.01 -.07 -.05 .000 -.076 -.162
educ .000 -.13 1 .185 -.01 .027 .015 -.113 .029 -.04 .006 -.04 .090 .000 .022 -.112
BUsty(l) .000 -.16 .185 1 -.26 .037 -.085 -.035 -.02 .014 -.02 -.01 .060 .000 .101 .021
LaS .000 .021 -.01 -.26 1 -.08 .064 -.044 .092 .025 .016 -.03 -.02 .000 -.026 .003
OT5C(1) .000 .238 .027 .037 -.08 1 -.010 -.040 -.29 -.13 -.08 .001 -.09 .000 .090 .007
VFloan(l) .000 -.00 .015 -.09 .064 -.01 1 .017 -.02 -.28 -.05 .079 -.23 .000 -.223 -.020
numgroup .000 .113 -.11 -.04 .109 -.09 .017 1 .004 .084 .088 .163 -.01 .000 .019 -.035
gen(2) .000 -.03 .029 -.02 .092 -.29 -.015 .004 1 .089 .243 .062 .177 .000 -.166 .054
sgmbtf(l) .000 -.15 -.04 .014 .025 -.13 -.277 .084 .089 1 .100 -.01 -.01 .000 .445 -.063
rulecond(l) .000 -.00 .006 -.02 .016 -.08 -.045 .088 .243 .100 1 .084 .067 .000 -.056 -.096
viseot(l) .000 -.06 -.04 -.01 .105 -.03 .001 .035 .043 -.01 .084 1 .022 .000 -.140 .017
Crovgr(l) .000 -.04 .090 .060 -.02 -.09 -.228 -.012 .177 -.01 .067 .022 1 .000 .029 -.071
training(l) -1.0 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1 .000 .000
distance .000 -.07 .022 .101 -.03 .090 -.223 .019 -.17 .445 -.06 -.14 .029 .000 1 -.020
Familysize .000 -.16 -.11 .021 -.17 .003 .007 -.055 -.07 -.06 -.09 .017 -.07 .000 -.020 1
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